Philosophy Data

Total number of Sentences = 4131
Num of Sentences Reduced to 8
Summary as follows:

it would therefore seem that the function of names is simply to refer and not to describe the objects so named by such properties as being the inventor of bifocals or being the first postmaster general it would seem that leibniz law and the law should not only hold in the universally quantified form but also in the form if a andfa then fb wherever a and b stand in an earlier distinction with the same purpose was of course the medieval one of de dicto de re that russell s distinction of scope eliminates modal paradoxes has been pointed out by many logicians especially smullyan so as to avoid misunderstanding let me emphasize that i am of course not asserting that russell s notion of scope solves quine s problem of essentialism what it does show especially in conjunction with modern model theoretic approaches to modal logic is that quantified modal logic need not deny the truth of all instances of x y x fx fy nor of all instances of x gx ga where a is to be replaced by a nonvacuous definite description whose scope is all of ga in order to avoid making it a necessary truth that one and the same man invented bifocals and headed the original postal department russell s contextual definition of description need not be adopted in order to ensure these results but other logical theories fregean or other which take descriptions as primitive must somehow express the same logical facts frege showed that a simple non iterated context containing a definite description with small scope which cannot be interpreted as being about the denotation of the description can be interpreted as about its sense some logicians have been interested in the question of the conditions under which in an intensional context a description with small scope is equivalent to the same one with large scope one of the virtues of a russellian treatment of descriptions in modal logic is that the answer roughly that the description be a rigid designator in the sense of this lecture then often follows from the other postulates for quantified modal logic no special postulates are needed as in hintikka s treatment even if descriptions are taken as primitive special postulation of when scope is irrelevant can often be deduced from more basic axioms place of names and f stands in place of a predicate expressing a genuine property of the object we can run the same argument through again to obtain the conclusion where a and b replace any names if a then necessarily a and so we could venture this conclusion that whenever a and b are proper names if a is that it is necessary that a is identity statements between proper names have to be necessary if they are going to be true at all this view in fact has been advocated for example by ruth barcan marcus in a paper of hers on the philosophical interpretation of modal logic according to this view whenever for example someone makes a correct statement of identity between two names such as for example that cicero is tullyactually there are many other ways other than taking something uniquely to satisfy f that might be included under referential uses of the the best short way to specify the semantics of ze f would seem to be this ze f refers in the unambiguous language to what would have been the speaker s referent of the f in the weak russell language under the same circumstances but this formulation makes it very implausible that the ambiguous language is anything but a chimerical model for english speaker s reference and semantic reference attributive phenomenon by a general pragmatic theory of speech acts applicable to a very wide range of languages the language hypothesis accounts for these same phenomena by positing a semantic ambiguity the unitary account appeals to a general apparatus that applies to cases such as the smith jones case where it is completely implausible that a semantic ambiguity exists according to the unitary account far from the referential use constituting a special namelike use of definite descriptions the referential attributive distinction is simply a special case of a general distinction applicable to proper names as well as to definite descriptions and illustrated in practice by the leaf raking and anyone who compares the smith jones case where presumably no one is tempted to posit a special semantic ambiguity with donnellan s cases of definite descriptions must surely be impressed by the similarity of the phenomena under these circumstances surely general methodological principles favor the existing account the apparatus of speaker s reference and semantic reference and of simple and complex uses of designators is needed anyway to explain the smith jones case it is applicable to all languages why posit a semantic ambiguity when it is both insufficient in general and super uous for the special case it seeks to explain and why are the phenomena regarding proper namesso there is one significant difference between the case of proper names and that of definite descriptions if someone uses jones to refer to smith he has misidentified smith as jones taken smith for someone else to some extentthen hesperus is phosphorus would have been true in that situation too he pointed maybe neither time to the planet venus at least one time he didn t point to th planet venus let s say when he pointed to the body he called phosphorus then in that case we can certainly say that the name phosphorus might not have referred to phosphorus we can even say that in the very position when viewed in the morning that we found phosphorus it might have been the case that phosphorus was not there that something else was there and that even under certain circumstances it would have been called phosphorus but that still is not a case in which phosphorus was not hesperus there might be a possible world in which a possible counterfactual situation in which hesperus and phosphorus weren t names of the things they in fact are names someone if he did determine their reference by identifying descriptions might even have used the very identifying descriptions we used but still that s not a case in which hesperus wasn t phosphorus for there couldn t have been such a case given that hesperus is phosphorus now this seems very strange because in advance we are inclined to say the answer to the question whether hesperus is phosphorus might have turned out either wayalso believes that the referent of london uniquely satisfies these same properties but pierre cannot combine the two beliefs into a single set of beliefs from which he can draw the normal conclusion that london and londres must have the same referent here the trouble comes not from london and londres but from england and angleterre and the rest indeed if he did draw what would appear to be the normal conclusion in this case and any of the other cases pierre would in fact be guilty of a logical fallacy of course the description theorist could hope to eliminate the problem by defining angleterre england and so on by appropriate descriptions also since in principle the problem may rear its head at the next level and at each subsequent level the description theorist would have to believe that an ultimate level can eventually be reached where the defining properties are pure properties not involving proper names nor natural kind terms or related terms see below i know of no convincing reason to suppose that such a level can be reached in any plausible way or that the properties can continue to be uniquely identifying if one attempts to eliminate all names and related devices such speculation aside the fact remains that pierre judged by the ordinary criteria for such judgments did learn both londres and london by exactly the same set of identifying properties yet the puzzle remains even in this case well then is there any way out of the puzzle aside from the principles of disquotation and translation only our normal practice of translation of french into english has been used since the principles of disquotation and translationthe elimination would be most plausible if we believed according to a russellian epistemology that all my language when written in unabbreviated notation refers to constituents with which i am acquainted in russell s sense then no one speaks a language intelligible to anyone else indeed no one speaks the same language twice few today will accept this a basic consideration should be stressed here moderate fregeans attempt to combine a roughly fregean view with the view that names are part of our common language and that our conventional practices of interlinguistic translation and interpretation are correct the problems of the present paper indicate that it is very difficult to obtain a requisite socialized notion of sense that will enable such a program to succeed extreme fregeans such as frege and russelli find it very hard to see how condition or condition can be a necessary condition for knowledge consider the photon case suppose that mary is a physicist who places a detector plate so that it detects any photon that happens to go to the right if the photon goes to the left she will have no idea whether a photon has been emitted or not suppose a photon is emitted that it does hit the detector plate which is at the right and that mary concludes that a photon has been emitted intuitively it seems clear that her conclusion indeed does constitute knowledge but is nozick s fourth condition satisfied no for it is not true according to nozick s conception of such counterfactuals that if a photon had been emitted mary would have believed that a photon was emitted the photon might well have gone to the left in which case mary would have had no beliefs about the matter here the method is held fixed change mary s belief which she certainly will have to the belief that a photon has been emitted and gone to the right in that case on nozick s view there is nothing wrong with condition indeed if a photon had been emitted and gone notice that nozick in the two examples changes the actual path of the photon from the left in the first quotation to the right in the second one in my own discussion i have assumed the second case to the right mary would have believed it even on nozick s understanding of the condition but hasn t failure of deductive closu run amok herei think it would be foolish to draw any conclusion positive or negative about substitutivity doctor and physician given this it seems hard to condemn our practice of translating both names as germany as loose in fact it would seem that hebrew just has two names for the same country where english gets by with one any inclinations to avoid problems by declaring say the translation of ashkenaz as germany to be loose should be considerably tempered by the discussion of analogous problems in the text in spite of this official view perhaps i will be more assertive elsewhere in the case of hesperus and phosphorus in contrast to cicero and tully where there is a case for the existence of conventional communitywide senses differentiating the two at least two distinct modes of fixing the reference of two rigid designators it is more plausible to suppose that the two names are definitely not interchangeable in belief contexts according to such a supposition a belief that hesperus is a planet is a belief that a certain heavenly body rigidly picked out as seen in the evening in the appropriate season is a planet and similarly for phosphorus one may argue that translation problems like pierre s will be blocked in this case that vesper must be translated as hesperus not as phosphorus as against this however two things of course nothing in these considerations prevents us from observing that jones can sincerely assert both cicero is bald and tully is not bald even though he is a normal speaker of english and uses cicero and tully in normal ways and with the normal referent pierre and the other paradoxical cases can be described similarly for those interested in one of my own doctrines we can still say that there was a time when men were in no epistemic position to assent to hesperus is phosphorus for want of empirical informationmay believe that his specific intention coincides with his general intention for one of two reasons in one case the simple case his specific intention is simply to refer to the semantic referent that is his specific intention is simply his general semantic intention for example he uses jones as a name of jones elaborate this according to your favorite theory of proper names and on this occasion simply wishes to use jones to refer to jones alternatively the complex case he has a specific intention which is distinct from his general intention but which he believes as a matter of fact to determine the same object as the one determined by his general intention for example he wishes to refer to the man over there but believes that he is jones in the simple case the speaker s referent is by definition the semantic referent donnellan shows in his paper that there are referential uses of a somewhat exceptional kind where the speaker or even both the speaker and the hearer are aware that the description used does not apply to the thing they are talking about for example they use the king knowing him to be a usurper but fearing the secret police analogous cases can be given for proper names if smith is a lunatic who thinks he is napoleon they may humor him largely for the sake of simplicity of exposition i have excluded such both from the notion of speaker s reference and from donnellan s referential use and the d languages belowhe also maintained a substitutivity principle for logically proper names in belief and other attitudinal contexts so that for him belief contexts were as transparent in any philosophically decent sense as truth functional contexts independently of russell s views there is much to be said for the opinion that the question whether a context is shakespearean is more important philosophically even for many purposes for which quine invokes his own concept than whether it is referentially opaque i will make some brief remarks about the relation of benson mates s problem see note to the present one mates argued that such a sentence as some doubt that all who believe that doctors are happy believe that physicians are happy may be true even though doctors and physicians are synonymous and even though it would have been false had physicians been replaced in it by a second occurrence of doctors church countered that could not be true since its translation into a language with only one word for doctors which would translate both doctors and physicians would be false if both mates s and church s intuitions were correct we might get a paradox analogous to pierre s applying the principles of translation and disquotation to mates s puzzle however involves many more complications than our present problem first if someone assents to doctors are happy but refuses assent to physicians are

Total number of Sentences = 4461
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Summary as follows:

says that there is some understandable being whose greatness cannot be conceived to be exceeded by the greatness of anything we have seen that greatnesses as thought of by the ontological arguer belong to beings paired with worlds according to the third premise no such pair has a greatness exceeding the greatness of a certain understandable beingbut if greatnesses belong to beings relative to worlds what are we talking about when we say the greatness of x which greatness of x the greatness of in which conceivable world different answers to the question yield different nonmodal translations of premise we might construe premise as saying that what is unexceeded is the actual greatness of the greatness of here in the actual world if we speak of the greatness of something without mentioning a world surely we ordinarily mean its greatness in the actual world for we are ordinarily not talking about any worlds except the actual world so it is plausible that even when other worlds are under discus sion we are speaking about the actual world unless we say otherwise thus introducing a name for the actual world we obtain this first nonmodal translation of premise there is an understandable being such that for no world and being does the greatness of in exceed the greatness of in the actual world alternatively we might construe premise as saying something weaker that what is unexceeded is the greatest greatness of the greatness of in any one of the worlds in which is at its greatest that is equivalent to saying merely that the greatness of in some world is unexceeded for if the greatness of in is unexceeded is one of the worlds in which is at its greatestexactly the same properties in that class identity at time is an indiscernibility relation for a significant class of properties of continuant persons those properties of a person which are logically determined by the properties of his stage at the class includes the properties of walking being tall being in a certain room being thirsty and believing in god at time t but not the properties of being forty three years old gaining weight being an ex communist or remembering one s childhood at the class is sizable enough at any rate to make clear that a relation of tensed identity is more of an indiscernibility relation than is identity along a path among roads if we are prepared to count a product of fusion as two while still demanding to count a person who will fission as one we can count at by the relation of identityat all times up to this is the relation that holds between continuants and if and only if they both exist at some time no later than at any time no later than either both exist or neither does and at any time no later than when both exist they have exactly the same stages again this is a relation among continuants that is weaker than identity to the extent that continuants share stages although derived from identity among stages it is of course not itself identity it is even more of an indiscernibility relation than identity at since it confers indiscernibility with respect to such properties as being forty three years old gaining weight in one sense being an ex communist and remembering one s childhood at t though still not with respect to such properties as being at the next winner of the state lottery it may be disconcerting that we can have a single name for one person counting by tensed identity who is really two nonidentical persons because he will later fission isn tis uniquely realized the carnap sentence clearly gives exactly the right specification it says that the terms name the entities in the tuple that is the unique realization of the first term names the first component of the unique realization of t names the second component and so on in case is not realized the carnap sentence says nothing about the denotation of the terms but this modesty seems to be uncalled for the terms were introduced on the assumption that was realized in order to name components of a realization of there is no realization of therefore they should not name anything phlogiston presumably is a theoretical term of an unrealized theory we say without hesistation that there is no such thing as phlogiston what else could we possibly say should we say that phlogiston is something or other but unless phlogiston theory turns out to be true after all we have no hope of finding out what let us say then that the theoretical terms of unrealized theories do not name anything that will do very well at least in the case of a theory like phlogiston philosophical foundations of physics new york by martin gardner ch replies and systematic expositions in the philosophy of rudolf carnap la salle open court ed schilpp section d on the use of hilbert s operator in scientific theories in essays on he foundations of mathematics dedicated to fraenkel on his seventieth anniversary jerusalem magnes press ed beobachtungssprache und theoretische sprache logica sludia paul bernays dedicata neuchatel griffon how to define terms theory which comes nowhere near being realized it will not do so well in the case of unrealized theory with a unique that is an tuple that does not realize the original theory but does realize some theory obtained from it by a slight weakening or a slight correction we might want to say that the theoretical terms name the components of whichever tuple comes nearest to realizing the theory if it comes near enough we will ignore this complication in part for the sake of simplicity and in part because we might hope to handle it as follows given a theory we might find a slightly weaker implied by but not implying such that an tuple is a realization of t if and only if it is a near realization ofcircumstances his life history of evidence and training recounted in physical terms in our data base may have led him understandably into error we should at least forbear from ascribing to karl those of our beliefs and desires which according to and our notions ofin the way i suggest in and how to define theoretical terms both in this volume and in my psychophysical and theoretical identifications australasian journal of philosophy donald davidson mental events in essays on actions and eventsreason he has been given no reason to share we should even ascribe to him those errors which we think we would have made or should have made if our evidence and training had been like his perhaps an improved principle of charity would require karl s beliefs and ours to be related as follows there must exist some common inductive method which would lead to approximately our present systems of belief if given our life histories of evidence and which would likewise lead to approximately the present system of beliefs ascribed to karl by ao if given karl s life history of evidence according to as for desires there must exist some common underlying system of basic intrinsic values which would yield approximately our systems of desires if given our systems of beliefs and which would likewise yield approximately the system of desires ascribed to karl by aoif given the system of beliefs ascribed to karl by ao diagrammatically there must exist and such that that approximately is important our common sense theory of persons tells us that karl s beliefs and desires may differ from ours not just because of karl s different evidence but also because of the effects of karl s different training on his underlying inductive method and basic intrinsic values he may or may not have learned to beware of hasty generalization or to like raw eel if our common sense theory without benefit of esoteric scientific knowledge told us just what these effects of training were we could build them into a still better version of the principal of charitya severe case of split personality on the other hand does consist of perfectly good person stages that are not very well related if he is said not to be fully a person that is an example of the kind of reduced personhood that permits us to claim that the relation and the i relation alike admit of degrees let us ignore the complications introduced by deficient person stages let us assume that all the stages under consideration are person stages to more or less the highest possible degree more generally we could perhaps say that the degree of i relatedness of two stages depends not on the absolute degree of personhood of the continuant if any that links them but rather on the relative degree of personhood of that continuant compared to the greatest degree of personhood that the degree of person stage hood of the stages could permit if two wolf child stages are person stages only to degreebut they are stages of a continuant that is a person to degreewe can say that the stages are therebyi related to degree if we say that a continuant person is an aggregate of interrelated person stages it is clear that personhood admits of degree to the extent that the relation does we can say something like this the degree of interrelatedness of an aggregate is the minimum degree of relatedness between any two stages in the aggregate better the greatest lower bound on the degrees of relatedness between any two stages but when we recall that a person should be a maximal such aggregate confusion sets in suppose we have an aggregate that is interrelated to degreeand it is not included in any larger aggregate that is interrelated to degree or greater suppose however that it is included in a much larger aggregate that is interrelated to degree we know the degree to which it qualifies as an interrelated aggregate but to what degree does it qualify as a maximal one that is to what degree does it qualify as a person if persons are maximal rinterrelated aggregates i am inclined to say it passes the interrelatedness test for personhood to degreebut at the same time it flunks the maximality test to degreehad best be understood as quantifying only over possible individuals modifications are called for if we wish to quantify over more of what there is granted none too enthusiastically that there are individuals not wholly in any world and hence incapable of being actualized in their entirety that consist of parts from several worlds some of these cross world individuals are unified by counterpart relations for instance there is the mereological sum of myself and all my i am not sure what to say about universals as advocated in armstrong universal and scientific realism cambridge university press except for this they are not to be confused with the sets of individuals that i call properties if there are universals they differ in many ways from properties and they meet completely different theoretical needs see my events in the sequel to this volume or what is not the same there is a cross world individual which is a maximal counterpart interrelated sum of possible individuals of whom i am one in fact there are many such more precisely let us call a world stage of iff is a possible individual entirely in one world and is part of y and is not a proper part of any other individual of which the same is true and let us call counterpart interrelated iff any two world stages of are counterparts and let us call maximal counterpartinterrelated or for short let us call it a modal continuant iff is counterpartinterrelated and is not a proper part of any other individual of which the same is true at this point it lies close to hand to suggest that ordinary things stars locomotives catswe can say that a speaker is truthful in if he tries not to utter any sentence a of unless a would be true in on the occasion of his utterance of a we can say that a hearer is trusting in if he believes an uttered sentence of to be true in on its occasion of utterance we may define an ambiguous language as a function that assigns to its sentences not single meanings but finite sets of alternative meanings we might or might not want to stipulate that these sets are non empty we can say that a sentence a is true in at under some meaningif and only if belongs to some member of r we can say that a is true in under some meaning if and only if our actual world belongs to some member of r we can say that someone is minimally truthful in if he tries not to utter any sentence a of unless a is true in under some meaning he is trusting if he believes an uttered sentence of to be true in under some meaning we may define a polymodal language as a function which assigns to its sentences meanings containing two components a set of worlds as before and something we can call a mood indicative imperative etc it makes no differencewhat things these are they might for instance be taken as code numbers we can say that a sentence ff is indicative imperative etc in according as the mood component of the meaning r is indicative imperative etcthis will not help much it is easy to imagine unsharp analyticity even in a population whose conventions of language are conventions to the highest degree in every way one might try to explain unsharp analyticity by recalling that we may not know whether some worlds are really possible if a sentence is true in our language in all worlds except some worlds of doubtful possibility then that sentence will be of doubtful analyticity but this will not help much either unsharp analyticity usually seems to arise because we cannot decide whether a sentence would be true in some bizarre but clearly possible world a better explanation would be that our convention of language is not exactly a convention of truthfulness and trust in a single language as i have said so far rather it is a convention of truthfulness and trust in whichever we please of some cluster of similar languages languages with more or less the same sentences and more or less the same truth values for the sentences in worlds close to our actual world but with increasing divergence in truth values as we go to increasingly remote bizarre worlds the convention confines us to the cluster but leaves us with indeterminacies whenever the languages of the cluster disagree we are free to settle these indeterminacies

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Summary as follows:

in favour of the view that some such huge collection of sensibles is the upper side of the half crown is the fact that we do seem to have a strong propensity to believe that any particular sensible which we directly apprehend in looking at the upper side of the half crown and of our direct apprehension of which the upper side is the source is in the place in which the upper side is and that some sense might be given to the expression in the same place as in which it could be true that sensibles of all sorts of different shapes and sizes and of all sorts of different colours were in the same place at the same time seems to me to be possible but the objection to this view seems to me to be the same as to the last namely that if the upper side of the half crown were identical with such a collection of sensibles then the only sense in which it could be said to be circular or bigger than that of the florin would certainly be very pickwickian though not the same as on that view if for the reasons given we reject both and as interpretations of our five propositions the only alternative i can think of that remains is one which is roughly identical so far as i can see with locke s view it is a view which asserts that the half crown and the florin really did exist in the natural sense before i saw them that they really are approximately circular again in the natural sense that therefore they are not composed of sensibles which i or others should directly apprehend under other conditions and that therefore also neither these sensibles even if such do now exist nor those which i am now directly apprehending are in the place in which the coins are it holds therefore that the coins do really resemble some sensibles in respect of the primary qualities which these have that they really are round and one larger than the other in much the same sense in which some sensibles are round and some larger than others but it holds also that no sensibles which we ever do directly apprehend or should directly apprehend if at a given time we were in other positions are parts of those coins and that therefore there is no reason to suppose that any parts of the coins have any of the secondary qualities colour etc which any of these sensibles have on this view it is plain there is nothing to prevent us from holding that as suggested in i all sorts of unexperienced sensibles do exist we are only prevented from holding that if they do those which have the same source all exist in the same place as their source and the natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally relatively to physical objects would be that none of them whether experienced or not were ever in the same place as any physical object that none therefore exist anywhere in physical space while at the same time we can also say as argued in i that none exist in the mind except in the sense that some are directly apprehended by some minds and the only thing that would need to be added is that some and some only resemble the physical objects which are their source in respect of their shape to this view i can see no objection except the serious one that it is difficult to answer the questions how can i ever come to know that these sensibles have a source at allit is to say that the property of not possessing and the property of being different from a are related to one another in the peculiar way in which the property of being a right angled triangle is related to that of being a triangle or that of being red to that of being coloured to complete the definition it is necessary however to define the sense in which different from a is to be understood there are two different senses which the statement that a is different from may bear it may be meant merely that a is numerically different from other than not identical with or it may be meant that not only is this the case but also that a is related to in a way which can be roughly expressed by saying that a is qualitatively different from and of these two meanings those who say all relations make a difference to their terms always i think mean difference in the latter sense and not merely in the former that is to say they mean that if be a relational property which belongs to then the absence of entails not only numerical difference from but qualitative difference but in fact from the proposition that a thing is qualitatively different from it does follow that it is also numerically different and hence they are maintaining that every relational property is internal to its terms in both of two different senses at the same time they are maintaining that if be a relational property which belongs to then is internal to a both in the sense that the absence of entails qualitative difference from a and that the absence of entails numerical difference from it seems to me that neither of these propositions is true and i will say something about each in turn as for the first i said before that i think some relational properties really are internal to their terms though by no means all arethis generalisation also gives a reason for the very theory which i am advocating namely that some of those data which i have called sense contents do exist it does this because it is quite certain that beliefs in generalisations about the existence of sense contents can and do constantly lead to true predictions the belief that when i have observed a fire of a certain size in my grate something similar to what i have observed will continue to exist for a certain time can and constantly does lead to the true prediction that when i come back to my room in half an hour s time i shall observe a fire of a certain size still burning we make predictions on such grounds i think every day and all day long and hence unless such beliefs as that what i observe when i see a fire burning does exist are true we certainly have no reason to suppose that beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally true and hence on this hypothesis also it remains true that unless some of the contents which i observe other than my own perceptions thoughts and feelings do exist i cannot have the slightest reason for supposing that the existence of certain perceptions of my own is generally connected with that of certain perceptions thoughts or feelings in any other person i conclude thereforethat unless some of the observed data which i have called sense contents do exist my own observations cannot give me the slightest reason for believing that anybody else has ever had any particular perception thought or feeling and having arrived so far towards an answer to my first questioni cannot think of any such instance and on the other hand this very proposition that any idea other than mere words which is true once would be true at any time seems to me to be one of those truths of which professor james has spoken as having an eternal absolute unconditional character as being perceptually obvious at a glance and needing no sense verification just as we know that if a particular colour differs more from black than from grey at one time the same colour would differ more from black than from grey at any time so it seems to me we can see that if a particular idea is true at one time the same idea would be true at any time it seems to me then that if we mean by an idea not mere words but the kind of idea which words express any idea which is true at one time when it occurs would be true at any time when it were to occur and that this is so even though it is an idea which refers to facts which are mutable my being in this room is a fact which is now but which certainly has not been at every time and will not be at every time and

Total number of Sentences = 2019
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we shall assume that falsifiable basic statements exist it should be borne in mind that when i speak of basic statements i am not referring to a system of accepted statements the system of basic statements as i use the term is to include rather all self consistent singular statements of a certain logical form all conceivable singular statements of fact as it were thus the system of all basic statements will contain many statements which are mutually incompatible as a first attempt one might perhaps try calling a theory empirical whenever singular statements can be deduced from it this attempt fails however because in order to deduce singular statements from a theory we always need other singular statements the initial conditions that tell us what to substitute for the variables in the theory as a second attempt one might try calling a theory empirical if singular statements are derivable with the help of other singular statements serving as initial conditions but this will not do either for even a nonempirical theory for example a tautological one would allow us to derive some singular statements from other singular statements according to the rules of logic we can for example say from the conjunction of twice two is four and here is a black raven there follows among other things it would not even be enough to demand that from the theory together with some initial conditions we should be able to deduce more than we could deduce from those initial conditions alone this demand would indeed exclude tautological theoriesthen singular statements must be available which can serve as premisses in falsifying inferences our criterion therefore appears only to shift the problem to lead us back from the question of the empirical character of theories to the question of the empirical character of singular statements yet even so something has been gained for in the practice of scientific research demarcation is sometimes of immediate urgency in connection with theoretical systems whereas in connection with singular statements doubt as to their empirical character rarely arises it is true that errors of observation occur and that they give rise to false singular statements but the scientist scarcely ever has occasion to describe a singular statement as non empirical or metaphysical problems of the empirical basis that is problems concerning the empirical character of singular statements and how they are tested thus play a part within that differs somewhat from that played by most of the other problems which will concern us for most of these stand in close relation to the practice of research whilst the problem of the empirical basis belongs almost exclusively to the theory of knowledge i shall have to deal with them however since they have given rise to many obscurities this is especially true of the relation between perceptual experiences and basic statements what i call a basic statement or a basic proposition is a statement which can serve as a premise in an empirical falsification in brief a statement of a singular fact perceptual experiences have often been regarded as providing a kind of justification for basic statements it was held that these statements are based upon these experiences that their truth becomes manifest by inspection through these experiences or that it is made evident by these experiences etc all these expressions exhibit the perfectly sound tendency to emphasize the close connection between basic statements and our perceptual experiences yet it was also rightly felt that statements can be logically justified only by statements thus the connection between the perceptions and the statements remained obscure and was described by correspondingly obscure expressions which elucidated nothing but slurred over the difficulties or at best adumbrated them through metaphors herethough if we succeed in so presenting the theory that it becomes a conjunction of a testable and a non testable part we know of course that we can now eliminate one of its metaphysical components the preceding paragraph of this note may be taken as illustrating another rule of method cf the end of note to section that after having produced some criticism of a rival theory we should always make a serious attempt to apply this or a similar criticism to our own theory inconsistent or which it rules out or prohibits we call this the class of the potential falsifiers of the theory and secondly the class of those basic statements which it does not contradict or which it permits we can put this more brie y by saying a theory is falsifiable if the class of its potential falsifiers is not empty it may be added that a theory makes assertions only about its potential falsifiers it asserts their falsity about the permitted basic statements it says nothing in particular it does not say that they are true we must clearly distinguish between falsifiability and falsification we have introduced falsifiability solely as a criterion for the empirical character of a system of statements as to falsification special rules must be introduced which will determine under what conditions a system is to be regarded as falsified we say that a theory is falsified only if we have accepted basic statements which contradict it cf this condition is necessary but not sufficient for we have seen that non reproducible single occurrences are of no significance to science thus a few stray basic statements contradicting a theory will hardly induce us to reject it as falsified we shall take it as falsified only if we discover a reproducible effect which refutes the theory in other words we only accept the falsification if a low level empirical hypothesis which describes such an effect is proposed and corroborated this kind of hypothesis may be called a falsifying hypothesisso after all it might be possible that the question of the probability of a hypothesis could be reduced say to that of the probability of events and thus be made susceptible to mathematical and logical handling like inductive logic in general the theory of the probability of hypotheses seems to have arisen through a confusion of psychological with logical questions admittedly our subjective feelings of conviction are of different intensities and the degree of confidence with which we await the fulfilment of a prediction and the further corroboration of a hypothesis is likely to depend among other things upon the way in which this hypothesis has stood up to tests so far upon its past corroboration but that these psychological questions do not belong to epistemology or methodology is pretty well acknowledged even by the believers in probability logic they argue however that it is possible on the basis of inductivist decisions to ascribe degrees of probability to the hypotheses themselves and further that it is possible to reduce this concept to that of the probability of events the probability of a hypothesis is mostly regarded as merely a special case of the general problem of the probability of a statement and this in the present section contains mainly a criticism of reichenbach s attempt to interpret the probability of hypotheses in terms of a frequency theory of the probability of events a criticism of keynes s approach is contained in section note that reichenbach is anxious to reduce the probability of a statement or hypothesis what carnap many years later called probabili to a frequency probabili turn is regarded as nothing but the problem of the probability of an event expressed in a particular terminology thus we read in reichenbach for example whether we ascribe probability to statements or to events is only a matter of terminology

Total number of Sentences = 3980
Num of Sentences Reduced to 7
Summary as follows:

observation who to say an empirical grounds that belief in objcts of one or another description is right or wronghow ca there ever be empirical evidence against existential statementsthe answer is something like this grant that a knowledge of the ap propriate stimulatory conditions of a sentence does not settle how to construe the sentence terms of existence of objcts still it does tend to settle what is to count as empirical evidence for or against the truth of the sentence if we then go on to assign the sentence some import in point of existence of objects by arbitrary proj ection in the case of the heathen language or as a matter of cou rse in the case of our own there upon what has already been counting as empirical evidence for or against the truth of the sentence comes to count as empirical evidence for or against the existence of the objcts the opportun ity for error in existential statements increases with one s mastery of the verbal apparatus of objective reference in one s earliest phase of word learning terms like mama and water were learned which may be viewed retrospectively as names each of an ob served spatiotemporal objct each such term was learned by a process of reinforcement and extinction whereby the spatiotemporal range of application of the term was gradually perfected theject named is as suredly an observed one in the sense that the reinforced stimu pro ceeded pretty directly from it granted this talk of name and objectbe longs to a later phase of language learning even as does the talk of stimulation speaking of ohjec the second phase marked by the advent of individuanw terms is where a proper notion of objectemerges we get general terms each true of each of many objects but the objcts still a rc observable spatiotemporal objcts for these individuative terms eg clpple are learned still by the old method of reinforcement aod extinction they dif fer from their predecessors only in the added feature of internal individu ation demoostrative singular tcrms like cthis apple usher a third phase characterized by the fact that a singular term seriously used can now through error fail to name the thing pointed to can turn out to hethe mere fa ade of an apple or maybe a tomato flut even at this stageany thing that we do succeed in namingit is ob vious that an expression cannot occur essentially in a statement if it oc curs only within expressions which occur vacuously in the statement consequently occurring in as it does only within the if at all does not occur essentially in s members of a occur essentially in its stead thus if we take as any nonmember of a occurring essentially in and repeat the above reasoning for each such expression we see that through definitions of all such expressions in terms of members of a becomes an abbreviation of a truth involving only members of a essentially thus if in particular we take a as the class of all logical expressions sions is accomplished by a single application of one definition but also when is a complex expression whose elimination calls for successive application of many defimtions the above tells us that if logical definitions be framed for all non logical expressions occurring essentially in the true statement becomes an abbreviation a truth involving only logical expressions essentially but if involves only logical expressions essentially and hence re mains true when everything except that skeleton of logical expressions is changed in all grammatically possible ways then depends for its truth upon those logical constituents alone and is thus a truth of logic it is therefore established that if all non logical expressions occurring essen tially in a true statement be given definitions on the basis solely of logic then becomes a a reviation of a truth of logic in particular then if all mathematical expressions be defined in terms of logic all truths involving only mathematical and logical expressions essentially become definitional abbreviations of trurhs of logic now a mathematical trurh for example smith s age plus brownthe latter claim does not represent an arbitrary extension of the term ogic to include mathematics agreement as to what belongs to logic and what belongs to mathematics is supposed at the outset and it is then claimed that definitions of mathematical expressions can so be framed on the basis of logical ones that all mathematical truths become a breviations of ogical ones although signs introduced by definition are formally arbitrary more than such arbitrary notational convention is involved in questions of definability otherwise any expression might be said to be definable on the basis of any expressions whatever when we speak of definability or of finding a definition for a given sign we have in mind some traditional usage of the sign antecedent to the definition in question to be satisfactory in this sense a definition of the sign not only must fulfill the formal requirement of unambiguous eliminability but must also conform to the traditional usage in question for such conformity it is necessary and sufficient that every context of the sign which was true and every context which was false under traditional usage be construed by the definition as an a bbreviation of some other statement which is correspondingly true or false under the established meanings of its signs thus when definitions of mathematical expressions on the basis of logical ones are said to have been framed what is meant is that definitions have been set up whereby every statement which so involves those mathematical expressions as to be recognized traditionally as true or as false is construed as an abbreviation of another correspondingly true or false statement which lacks those mathematical expressions and exhibits only logical ex pressions in their stead note that an expression said to be defined in rermand g of logic not only when it a gie sign whose elimination from a context in favor of logical expresan expression will be said to occur vacuously in a given statement replacement therein by any and every other grammatically admissible expression leaves the truth or falsehood of the statement unchanged thus for any statement containing some expressions vacuously there is a class of statements descri bable as vacuous variants of the given state ment which are like it in point of truth or falsehood like it also in point a certain skeleton of symbolic make up but diverse in exhibiting all grammatically possible variations upon the vacuous constituents of the given statementthe contrasts between elementary logic and set theory are so fundamental that one might well limit the word logic to the former though shal not and speak of set theory as mathematics in a sense exclusive of logic to adopt this course is merely to deprive of the sta tus of a logical word fregc derivation of arithmetic would then cease to count as a derivation from logic for he used set theory at any rate we should be prepared to find that the linguistic doctrine of logical truth holds for elementary logic and fails for set theory or vice versa kant s readiness to see logic as analytic and arithmetic as synthetic in particu lar is not superseded by frcge s worka frege suppose if logic be taken as elementary logic and for kant logic certainly did not include set theory where someone disagrees with us as to the truth of a sentence it often happens that we can convince him by getting the sentence from other sentences which he does accept by a series of steps each of which he ac cepts disagreement which cannot be thus resolved i shall call deduc tively irresoluble now if we try to warp the linguistic doctrine of logical truth around into something like an experimental thesis perhaps a first approximation will run thu deductively irresoluble disagreement as to a logical truth is evidence of deviat in usage or meanings wordsthe effect of our effort to injectcontent into the linguistic doctrine of logical truth has been up to now to suggest that the doctrine says nothing worth saying about elementary logical truth bur that when applied to set theoretic truth it makes for a reasonable partial condensation of the otherwise vaporous notion of meaning as applied to the linguistic doctrine of logical truth is sometimes expressed by saying that such truths are true by linguistic convention now if this be so cer catnap and logical truthtainly the conventions are not in general explicit relatively few persons before the time of carnap had ever seen any convention that engen dered truths elementary logic nor can this circumstance be ascribed merely to the slipshod ways of our predecessors for it is impossible in principle even in an ideal state to get even the most elementary part of logic exclusively by the explicit application of conventions stated in ad vance the difficulty is the vicious regress familiar from lewis carroll which i have elaborated elsewhere briefly the point is that the logical truths being infinite in number must be given by general conventions rather than singly and logic is needed then to begin with in the meta theory in order to apply the general conventions to individual cases in dropping the attributes of deli berateness and explicitness from the notion of linguistic convention i went on to complain in the a forementioned paper we risk depriving the latter of any explanatory force and reducing it to an idle label it would seem that to call elementary logic true by convention is to add nothing but a metaphor to the linguistic doctrine of logical truth which as applied to elementary logic has itself come to seem rather an empty figuremorta quantifier is followed by no germane occurrence of variable in a word necessity as sentence operator docs not go over into terms of ne cessity as semantical predicate reover acceptance of necessity as a sentence operator implies an attitude quite opposite to our earlier one in i a bove which was that nee as statement operator is referentially opaque for one would clearly have no business quantifying into a referentially opaque context witness above we can reasonably infer nec x from nee only if we regard the latter as telling us something about the object a number viz that it necessarily exceeds if nec can turn out true or false of the number depending merely on how that number is referred to a the falsity of suggests then evidently nee x expresses no genuine condition on objcts of any kind if the oc currence of in nec is not purely referential then putting x for in nec makes no more sense than putting x for nine within the context canine isn t it settled by truth of and and falsity of that the occurrence question irrcferential and more generally that nec is referentially opaque andhence that nec as a sentence oper ator under quantifiers is a mistakno one is prepared to accede to certain pretty drastic departures as we shall see thus far we have tentatively condemned necessitv as general sentence operator on the ground that nec is referentially opaque its referential opacity has been shown by a brcakdown in the operation of putting one constant singular term for another which names the same objct but it may ustly be protested that constant singular terms are a notational ac cident not needed at the level primitive notation for itthe containing statement remains unchanged in truth value naturally one would not expect oc currences of statements within referentially opaque contexts such as quotations to be the truth becomes false when the contained statement is supplanted by another napo leon escaped from elba which has the same truth value as again the truth i is carried by that same substitution into the false hood one might not expect occurrences of statements within state ments to be truth functional in general even when the contexts are not referentially opaque certainly not when the contexts are referentially opaque tn mathematical logic however a policy of extensionality is widely espoused a policy of admitting statements within statements truth functionally only apart of course from such contexts as quotation which are referentially opaque note that the semantical predicate nec as is reconcilanle with this policy of extensionality since what ever breach of extensional ityit tnima facie involves is shared by exam ples like and attributable to the referential opacity of quotation we can always switch to the spelling expedient thus rewriting as nec like and indeed and unlike and contains compo nent statement but only a name a statement the statement operator nec on the other hand is a premeditated de parture from extensionality the occurrence of the truth in is non truth functional since by supplanting it by a different truth we can turn the true context into a falsehood such as such occurrences moreover are not looked upon as somehow spurious or irrelevant to logical structure like occurrences in quotation or like cat in catrle on the contrary the modal logic typified in is usually put forward as a corrective of extensionality

Total number of Sentences = 2431
Num of Sentences Reduced to 4
Summary as follows:

a belief is rendered true or false by relation to a fact which may lie outside the experience of the person entertaining the belief truth and falsehood except in the case of beliefs about our own minds depend upon the relations of mental occurrences to outside things and thus take us beyond the analysis of mental occurrences as they are in themselves nevertheless we can hardly avoid the consideration of truth and falsehood we wish to believe that our beliefs sometimes at least yield and a belief does not yield knowledge unless it is true the question whether our minds are instruments of knowledge and if so in what sense is so vital that any suggested analysis of mind must be examined in relation to this question to ignore this question would be like describing a chronometer without regard to its accuracy as a time keeper or a thermometer without mentioning the fact that it measures temperature many difficult questions arise in connection with knowledge it is difficult to define knowledge difficult to decide whether we have any knowledge and difficult even if it is conceded that we sometimes have knowledge to discover whether we can ever know that we have knowledge in this or that particular case i shall divide the discussion into four parts we may regard knowledge from a behaviourist standpoint as exhibited in a certain kind of response to the environment this response must have some characteristics which it shares with those of scientific instruments but must also have others that are peculiar to knowledge we shall find that this point of view is important but not exhaustive of the nature of knowledge we may hold that the beliefs that constitute knowledge are distinguished from such as are erroneous or uncertain by properties which are intrinsic either to single beliefs or to systems of beliefs being in either case discoverable without reference to outside fact views of this kind have been widely held among philosophersit seems that we must maintain our distinction words used demonstratively describe and are intended to lead to sensations while the same words used in narrative describe and are only intended to lead to images we have thus in addition to our four previous ways in which words can mean two new ways namely the way of memory and the way of imagination that is to say words may be used to describe or recall a memory image to describe it when it already exists or to recall it when the words exist as a habit and are known to be descriptive of some past experience words may be used to describe or create an imagination image to describe it for example in the case of a poet or novelist or to create it in the ordinary case for giving information though in the latter case it is intended that the imagination image when created shall be accompanied by belief that something of the sort occurred these two ways of using words including their occurrence in inner speech may be spoken of together as the use of words in thinking if we are right the use of words in thinking depends at least in its origin upon images and cannot be fully dealt with on behaviourist lines and this is really the most essential function of words namely that originally through their connection with images they bring us into touch with what is remote in time or space when they operate without the medium of images this seems to be a telescoped process thus the problem of the meaning of words is brought into connection with the problem of the meaning of images to understand the function that words perform in what is called thinking we must understand both the causes and the effects of their occurrence the causes of the occurrence of words require somewhat different treatment according as the object designated by the word is sensibly present or absent when the object is present it may itself be taken as the cause of the word through associationthe true philosophic contemplation on the contrary finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not self in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated and thereby the subject contemplating everything in contemplation that is personal or private everything that depends upon habit self interest or desire distorts the object and hence impairs the union which the intellect seeks by thus making a barrier between subject and object such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect the free intellect will see as god might see without a here and now without hopes and fears without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices calmly dispassionately in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge knowledge as impersonal as purely contemplative as it is possible for man to attain hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter than the knowledge brought by the senses and dependent as such knowledge must be upon an exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense organs distort as much as they reveal the mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same freedom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion it will view its purposes and desires as parts of the whole with the absence of insistence that results from seeing them as infinitesimal fragments in a world of which all the rest is unaffected by any one man s deeds the impartiality which in contemplation is the unalloyed desire for truth is the very same quality of mind which in action is justice and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all and not only to those who are judged useful or admirable thus contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts but also the objects of our actions and our affections it makes us citizens of the universe not only of one walled city at war with all the rest in this citizenship of the universe consists man s true freedom and his liberation from the thraldom of narrow hopes and fears thus to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy philosophy is to be studied not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can as a rule be known to be true but rather for the sake of the questions themselves because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation but above all because through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates the mind also is rendered great and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest goodshortly i come now to the other characteristic which memory images must have in order to account for our knowledge of the past they must have some characteristic which makes us regard them as referring to more or less remote portions of the past that is to say if we suppose that a is the event remembered the remembering and the interval of time between a and there must be some characteristic of which is capable of degrees and which in accurately dated memories varies as varies it may increase as increases or diminish as increases the question which of these occurs is not of any importance for the theoretic serviceability of the characteristic in question in actual fact there are doubtless various factors that concur in giving us the feeling of greater or less remoteness in some remembered event there may be a specific feeling which could be called the feeling of pastness especially where immediate memory is concerned but apart from this there are other marks one of these is context a recent memory has usually more context than a more distant one when a remembered event has a remembered context this may occur in two ways either a by successive images in the same order as their prototypes or b by remembering a whole process simultaneously in the same way in which a present process may be apprehended through akoluthic sensations which by fading acquire the mark of just pastness in an increasing degree as they fade and are thus placed in a series while all sensibly present it will be context in this second sense more specially that will give us a sense of the nearness or remoteness of a remembered event there is of course a difference between knowing the temporal relation of a remembered event to the present and knowing the time order of two remembered events very often our knowledge of the temporal relation of a remembered event to the present is inferred from its temporal relations to other remembered events

Total number of Sentences = 2295
Num of Sentences Reduced to 4
Summary as follows:

for the same reason i believe in all other modern nations of europe all accounts are kept and the value of all goods and of all estates is generally computed in silver and when we mean to express the amount of a person s fortune we seldom mention the number of guineas but the number of pounds sterling which we suppose would be given for it originally in all countries i believe a legal tender of payment could be made only in the coin of that metal which was peculiarly considered as the standard or measure of value in england gold was not considered as a legal tender for a long time after it was coined into money the proportion between the values of gold and silver money was not fixed by any public law or proclamation but was left to be settled by the market if a debtor offered payment in gold the creditor might either reject such payment altogether or accept of it at such a valuation of the gold as he and his debtor could agree upon copper is not at present a legal tender except in the change of the smaller silver coins in this state of things the distinction between the metal which was the standard and that which was not the standard was something more than a nominal distinction in process of time and as people became gradually more familiar with the use of the different metals in coin and consequently better acquainted with the proportion between their respective values it has in most countries i believe been found convenient to ascertain this proportion and to declare by a public law that a guinea for example of such a weight and fineness should exchange for one and twenty shillings or be a legal tender for a debt of that amount in this state of things and during the continuance of any one regulated proportion of this kind the distinction between the metal which is the standard and that which is not the standard becomes little more than a nominal distinction in consequence of any change however in this regulated proportion this distinction becomes or at least seems to become something more than nominal again if the regulated value of a guinea for example was either reduced to twenty or raised to two and twenty shillings all accounts being kept and almost all obligations for debt being expressed in silver money the greater part of payments could in either case be made with the same quantity of silver money as before but would require very different quantities of gold money a greater in the one case and a smaller in the other silver would appear to be more invariable in its value than gold silver would appear to measure the value of gold and gold would not appear to measure the value of silver the value of gold would seem to depend upon the quantity of silver which it would exchange for and the value of silver would not seem to depend upon the quantity of gold which it would exchange for this difference however would be altogether owing to the custom of keeping accounts and of expressing the amount of all great and small sums rather in silver than in gold money one of mr drummond s notes for five and twenty or fifty guineas would after an alteration of this kind be still payable with five and twenty or fifty guineas in the same manner as before it would after such an alteration be payable with the same quantity of gold as before but with very different quantities of silver in the payment of such a note gold would appear to be more invariable in its value than silver gold would appear to measure the value of silver and silver would not appear to measure the value of gold if the custom of keeping accounts and of expressing promissory notes and other obligations for money in this manner should ever become general gold and not silver would be considered as the metal which was peculiarly the standard or measure of value in reality during the continuance of any one regulated proportion between the respective values of the different metals in coin the value of the most precious metal regulates the value of the whole coin twelve copper pence contain half a pound avoirdupois of copper of not the best quality which before it is coined is seldom worth seven pence in silvervaries extremely according to the diversity of their employment as does likewise the value which that employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country a capital may be employed in four different ways either first in procuring the rude produce annually required for the use and consumption of the society or secondly in manufacturing and preparing that rude produce for immediate use and consumption or thirdly in transporting either the rude or manufactured produce from the places where they abound to those where they are wanted or lastly in dividing particular portions of either into such small parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who want them in the first way are employed the capitals of all those who undertake improvement or cultivation of lands mines or fisheries in the second those of all master manufacturers in the third those of all wholesale merchants and in the fourth those of all retailers it is difficult to conceive that a capital should be employed in any way which may not be classed under some one or other of those four each of those four methods of employing a capital is essentially necessary either to the existence or extension of the other three or to the general conveniency of the society unless a capital was employed in furnishing rude produce to a certain degree of abundance neither manufactures nor trade of any kind could exist unless a capital was employed in manufacturing that part of the rude produce which requires a good deal of preparation before it can be fit for use and consumption it either would never be produced because there could be no demand for it or if it was produced spontaneously it would be of no value in exchange and could add nothing to the wealth of the society unless a capital was employed in transporting either the rude or manufactured produce from the places where it abounds to those where it is wanted no more of either could be produced than was necessary for the consumption of the neighbourhood the capital of the merchant exchanges the surplus produce of one place for that of another and thus encourages the industry and increases the enjoyments of both unless a capital was employed in breaking and dividing certain portions either of the rude or manufactured produce into such small parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who want them every man would be obliged to purchase a greater quantity of the goods he wanted than his immediate occasions required if there was no such trade as a butcher for example every man would be obliged to purchase a whole ox or a whole sheep at a time this would generally be inconvenient to the rich and much more so to the poor if a poor workman was obliged to purchase a month s or six months provisions at a time a great part of the stock which he employs as a capital in the instruments of his trade or in the furniture of his shop and which yields him a revenue he would be forced to place in that part of his stock which is reserved for immediate consumption and which yields him no revenue nothing can be more convenient for such a person than to be able to purchase his subsistence from day to day or even from hour to hour as he wants it he is thereby enabled to employ almost his whole stock as a capital he is thus enabled to furnish work to a greater value and the profit which he makes by it in this way much more than compensates the additional price which the profit of the retailer imposes upon the goods the prejudices of some political writers against shopkeepers and tradesmen are altogether without foundation so far is it from being necessary either to tax them or to restrict their numbers that they can never be multiplied so as to hurt the public though they may so as to hurt one another the quantity of grocery goods for example which can be sold in a particular town is limited by the demand of that town and its neighbourhood the capital therefore which can be employed in the grocery tradethe price of spanish gold therefore as it affords both less rent and less profit must in the spanish market be somewhat nearer to the lowest price for which it is possible to bring it thither than the price of spanish silver when all expenses are computed the whole quantity of the one metal it would seem cannot in the spanish market be disposed of so advantageously as the whole quantity of the other the tax indeed of the king of portugal upon the gold of the brazils is the same with the ancient tax of the king of spain upon the silver of mexico and peru or one fifth part of the standard metal it may therefore be uncertain whether to the general market of europe the whole mass of american gold comes at a price nearer to the lowest for which it is possible to bring it thither than the whole mass of american silver the price of diamonds and other precious stones may perhaps be still nearer to the lowest price at which it is possible to bring them to market than even the price of gold though it is not very probable that any part of a tax which is not only imposed upon one of the most proper subjects of taxation a mere luxury and superfluity but which affords so very important a revenue as the tax upon silver will ever be given up as long as it is possible to pay it yet the same impossibility of paying it which in made it necessary to reduce it from one fifth to one tenth may in time make it necessary to reduce it still further in the same manner as it made it necessary to reduce the tax upon gold to one twentieth that the silver mines of spanish america like all other mines become gradually more expensive in the working on account of the greater depths at which it is necessary to carry on the works and of the greater expense of drawing out the water and of supplying them with fresh air at those depths is acknowledged by everybody who has inquired into the state of those mines these causes which are equivalent to a growing scarcity of silver for a commodity may be said to grow scarcer when it becomes more difficult and expensive to collect a certain quantity of it must in time produce one or other of the three following events the increase of the expense must either first be compensated altogether by a proportionable increase in the price of the metal or secondly it must be compensated altogether by a proportionable diminution of the tax upon silver or thirdly it must be compensated partly by the one and partly by the other of those two expedientsthe merchant must wait for the returns of two distinct foreign trades before he can employ the same capital in repurchasing a like quantity of british manufactures if the tobacco of virginia had been purchased not with british manufactures but with the sugar and rum of jamaica which had been purchased with those manufactures he must wait for the returns of three if those two or three distinct foreign trades should happen to be carried on by two or three distinct merchants of whom the second buys the goods imported by the first and the third buys those imported by the second in order to export them again each merchant indeed will in this case receive the returns of his own capital more quickly but the final returns of the whole capital employed in the trade will be just as slow as ever whether the whole capital employed in such a round about trade belong to one merchant or to three can make no difference with regard to the country though it may with regard to the particular merchants three times a greater capital must in both cases be employed in order to exchange a certain value of british manufactures for a certain quantity of flax and hemp than would have been necessary had the manufactures and the flax and hemp been directly exchanged for one another the whole capital employed therefore in such a round about foreign trade of consumption will generally give less encouragement and support to the productive labour of the country than an equal capital employed in a more direct trade of the same kind whatever be the foreign commodity with which the foreign goods for home consumption are purchased it can occasion no essential difference either in the nature of the trade or in the encouragement and support which it can give to the productive labour of the country from which it is carried on if they are purchased with the gold of brazil for example or with the silver of peru this gold and silver like the tobacco of virginia must have been purchased with something that either was the produce of the industry of the country or that had been purchased with something else that was so so far therefore as the productive labour of the country is concerned the foreign trade of consumption which is carried on by means of gold and silver has all the advantages and all the inconveniencies of any other equally round about foreign trade of consumption and will replace just as fast or just as slow the capital which is immediately employed in supporting that productive labour it seems even to have one advantage over any other equally round about foreign trade the transportation of those metals from one place to another on account of their small bulk and great value is less expensive than that of almost any other foreign goods of equal value

Total number of Sentences = 1368
Num of Sentences Reduced to 2
Summary as follows:

the method of financing the policy and the increased working cash required by the increased employment and the associated rise of prices may have the effect of increasing the rate of interest and so retarding investment in other directions unless the monetary authority takes steps to the contrary whilst at the same time the increased cost of capital goods will reduce their marginal efficiency to the private investor and this will require an actual fall in the rate of interest to offset it with the confused psychology which often prevails the government programme may through its effect on confidence increase liquidity preference or diminish the marginal efficiency of capital which again may retard other investment unless measures are taken to offset it in an open system with foreign trade relations some part of the multiplier of the increased investment will accrue to the benefit of employment in foreign countries since a proportion of the increased consumption will diminish our own country s favourable foreign balance so that if we consider only the effect ondomestic employment as distinct from world employment we must diminish the full figure of the multiplier on the other hand our own country may recover a portion of this leakage through favourable repercussions due to the action of the multiplier in the foreign country in increasing its economic activity furthermore if we are considering changes of a substantial amount we have to allow for a progressive change in the marginal propensity to consume as the position of the margin is gradually shifted and hence in the multiplier the marginal propensity to consume is not constant for all levels of employment and it is probable that there will be as a rule a tendency for it to diminish as employment increases when real income increases that is to say the community will wish to consume a gradually diminishing proportion of it there are also other factors over and above the operation of the general rule just mentioned which may operate to modify the marginal propensity to consume and hence the multiplier and these other factors seem likely as a rule to accentuate the tendency of the general rule rather than to offset jt for in the first place the increase of employment will tend owing to the effect of diminishing returns in the short period to increase the proportion of aggregate income which accrues to the entrepreneurs whose individual marginal propensity to consume is probably less than the average for the community as a whole in the second place unemployment is likely to be associated with negative saving in certain quarters private or public because the unemployed may be living either on the savings of themselves and their friends or on public relief which is partly financed out of loans with the result that reemployment will gradually diminish these particular acts of negative saving and reduce therefore the marginal propensity to consume more rapidly than would have occurred from an equal increase in the community s real income accruing in different circumstances in any case the multiplier is likely to be greater for a small net increment of investment than for a large increment so that where substantial changes are in view we must be guided by the average value of the multiplier based on the average marginal propensity to consume over the range in question mr kahn has examined the probable quantitative result of such factors as these in certain hypothetical special cases but clearly it is not possible to carry any generalisation very far one can only say for example that a typical modern community would probably tend to consume not much less than percent of any increment of real income if it were a closed system with the consumption of the unemployed paid for by transfers from the consumption of other consumers so that the multiplier after allowing for offsets would not be much less than in a country however where foreign trade accounts for say percent of consumption and where the unemployed receive out of loans or their equivalent up to say percent of their normal consumption when in work the multiplier may fall as low as or times the employment provided by a specific new investment thus a given fluctuation of investment will be associated with a much less violent fluctuation of employment in a country in which foreign trade plays a large part and unemployment relief is financed on a larger scale out of borrowing as was the case eg in great britain in than in a country in which these factors are less important as in the united states in it is however to the general principle of the multiplier to which we have to look for an explanation of how fluctuations in the amount of investment which are a comparatively small proportion of the national income are capable of generating fluctuations in aggregate employment and income so much greater in amplitude than themselves the discussion has been carried on so far on the basis of a change in aggregate investment which has been foreseen sufficiently in advance for the consumption industries to advance pari passu with the capital goods industries without more disturbance to the price of consumption goods than is consequential in conditions of decreasing returns on an increase in the quantity which is produced in general however we have to take account of the case where the initiative comes from an increase in the output of the capital goods industries which was not fully foreseenis the modern version of the classical tradition contemporary thought is still deeply steeped in the notion that if people do not spend their money in one way they will spend it in another post war economists seldom indeed succeed in maintaining this standpoint consistently for their thought to day is too much permeated with the contrary tendency and with facts of experience too obviously inconsistent with their former view but they have not drawn sufficiently far reaching consequences and have not revised their fundamental theory in the first instance these conclusions may have been applied to the kind of economy in which we actually live by false analogy from some kind of non exchange robinson crusoe economy in which the income which individuals consume or retain as a result of their productive activity is actually and exclusively the output in specie of that activity but apart from this the conclusion that the costs of output are always covered in the aggregate by the sale proceeds resulting from demand has great plausibility because it is difficult to distinguish it from another similar looking proposition which is indubitable namely that the income derived in the aggregate by all the elements in the community concerned in a productive activity necessarily has a value exactly equal to the value of the output similarly it is natural to suppose that the act of an individual by which he enriches himself without apparently taking anything from anyone else must also enrich the community as a whole so that as in the passage just quoted from marshall an act of individual saving inevitably leads to a parallel act of investment for once more it is indubitable that the sum of the net increments of the wealth of individuals must be exactly equal to the aggregate net increment of the wealth of the community those who think in this way are deceived nevertheless by an optical illusion which makes two essentially different activities appear to be the same they are fallaciously supposing that there is a nexus which unites decisions to abstain from present consumption with decisions to provide for future consumption whereas the motives which determine the latter are not linked in any simple way with the motives which determine the former it is then the assumption of equality between the demand price of output as a whole and its supply price which is to be regarded as the classical theory s axiom of parallels granted this all the rest follows the social advantages of private and national thrift the traditional attitude towards the rate of interest the classical theory of unemployment the quantity theory of money the unqualified advantages of laissez faire in respect of foreign trade and much else which we shall have to question at different points in this chapter we have made the classical theory to depend in succession on the assumptions that the real wage is equal to the marginal disutility of the existing employment that there is no such thing as involuntary unemployment in the strict sense that supply creates its own demand in the sense that the aggregate demand price is equal to the aggregate supply price for all levels of output and employment these three assumptions however all amount to the same thing in the sense that they all stand and fall together any one of them logically involving the other two we need to start with a few terms which will be defined precisely later in a given state of technique resources and costs the employment of a given volume of labour by an entrepreneur involves him in two kinds of expense first of all the amounts which he pays out to the factors of production exclusive of other entrepreneurs for their current services which we shall call the factor cost of the employment in question and secondly the amounts which he pays out to other entrepreneurs for what he has to purchase from them together with the sacrifice which he incurs by employing the equipment instead of leaving it idle which we shall call the user cost of the employment in question the excess of the value of the resulting output over the sum of its factor cost and its user cost is the profit or as we shall call it the income of the entrepreneur the factor cost is of course the same thing looked at from the point of view of the entrepreneur as what the factors of production regard as their income thus the factor cost and the entrepreneur s profit make up between them what we shall define as the total income resulting from the employment given by the entrepreneur the entrepreneur s profit thus defined is as it should be the quantity which he endeavours to maximise when he is deciding what amount of employment to offer it is sometimes convenient when we are looking at it from the entrepreneur s standpoint to call the aggregate income i e factor cost plus profit resulting from a given amount of employment the proceeds of that employment on the other hand the aggregate supply price of the output of a given amount of employment is the expectation of proceeds which will just make it worth the while of the entrepreneurs to give that employment it follows that in a given situation of technique resources and factor cost per unit of employment the amount of employment both in each individual firm and industry and in the aggregate depends on the amount of the proceeds which the entrepreneurs expect to receive from the corresponding output for entrepreneurs will endeavour to fix the amount of employment at the level which they expect to maximise the excess of the proceeds over the factor cost

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they will get precisely the same profits whatever may be the quantity of gross produce which one may obtain more than the other and consequently they will be all taxed alike suppose the gross produce of the land of the qualityand of no and each to be taxed quarters the difference between the produce of no after paying the tax will be the same as before for if no be reduced to no to qrs the difference between and will be as before qrs and of no if after the tax the prices of corn and of every other commodity should remain the same as before money rent as well as corn rent would continue unaltered but if the price of corn and every other commodity should rise in consequence of the tax money rent will also rise in the same proportion if the price of corn were per quarter the rent of no would have been but if corn rose ten percent or to rent would also rise ten percent for twenty quarters of corn would then be worth so that in every case the landlord will be unaffected by such a tax a tax on the profits of stock always leaves corn rent unaltered and therefore money rent varies with the price of corn but a tax on raw produce or tithes never leaves corn rent unaltered but generally leaves money rent the same as before in another part of this work i have observed that if a land tax of the same money amount were laid on every kind of land in cultivation without any allowance for difference of fertility it would be very unequal in its operation as it would be a profit to the landlord of the more fertile lands it would raise the price of corn in proportion to the burden borne by the farmer of the worst land but this additional price being obtained for the greater quantity of produce yielded by the better land farmers of such land would be benefited during their leases and afterwards the advantage would go to the landlord in the form of an increase of rent the effect of an equal tax on the profits of the farmer is precisely the same it raises the money rent of the landlords if money retains the same value but as the profits of all other trades are taxed as well as those of the farmer and consequently the prices of all goods as well as corn are raised the landlord loses as much by the increased money price of the goods and corn on which his rent is expended as he gains by the rise of his rent if money should rise in value and all things should after a tax on the profits of stock fall to their former prices rent also would be the same as before the landlord would receive the same money rent and would obtain all the commodities on which it was expended at their former price so that under all circumstances he would continue untaxed a tax on the profits of stock would also affect the stockholder if all commodities were to rise in proportion to the tax but if from the alteration in the value of money all commodities were to sink to their former priceit would raise the wages of labour and lower profits it may then be objected against such a tax st that by raising the wages of labour and lowering profits it is an unequal tax as it affects the income of the farmer trader and manufacturer and leaves untaxed the income of the landlord stockholder and others enjoying fixed incomes that there would be a considerable interval between the rise in the price of corn and the rise of wages during which much distress would be experienced by the labourer that raising wages and lowering profits is a discouragement to accumulation and acts in the same way as a natural poverty of soil that by raising the price of raw produce the prices of all commodities into which raw produce enters would be raised and that therefore we should not meet the foreign manufacture on equal terms in the general market with respect to the first objection that by raising the wages of labour and lowering profits it acts unequally as it affects the income of the farmer trader and manufacturer and leaves untaxed the income of the landlord stockholder and others enjoying fixed incomes it may be answered that if the operation of the tax be unequal it is for the legislature to make it equal by taxing directly the rent of land and the dividends from stock by so doing all the objects of an income tax would be obtained without the inconvenience of having recourse to the obnoxious measure of prying into every man s concerns and arming commissioners with powers repugnant to the habits and feelings of a free country with respect to the second objection that there would be a considerable interval between the rise of the price of corn and the rise of wages during which much distress would be experienced by the lower classes i answer that under different circumstances wages follow the price of raw produce with very different degrees of celerity that in some cases no effect whatever is produced on wages by a rise of corn in others the rise of wages precedes the rise in the price of corn again in some the effect is slow and in others the interval must be very short those who maintain that it is the price of necessaries which regulates the price of labour always allowing for the particular state of progression in which the society may be seem to have conceded too readily that a rise or fall in the price of necessaries will be very slowly succeeded by a rise or fall of wages a high price of provisions may arise from very different causes and may accordingly produce very different effects it may arise from st from a gradually increasing demand which may be ultimately attended with an increased cost of production from a fall in the value of money from taxes on necessaries these four causes have not been sufficiently distinguished and separated by those who have inquired into the influence of a high price of necessaries on wages we will examine them severally a bad harvest will produce a high price of provisions and the high price is the only means by which the consumption is compelled to conform to the state of the supply if all the purchasers of corn were rich the price might rise to any degree but the result would remain unaltered the price would at last be so high that the least rich would be obliged to forego the use of a part of the quantity which they usually consumed as by diminished consumption alone the demand could be brought down to the limits of the supply under such circumstances

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the reason was that we failed to cope with our tasks the masses of the workers proved to be more active than we we lacked adequately trained revolutionary leaders and organizers aware of the mood prevailing among all the opposition strata and able to march at the head of the movement convert the spontaneous demonstrations into a political demonstration broaden its political character etc under such circumstances our backwardness will inevitably be utilized by the more mobile and more energetic non social democratic revolutionaries and the workers no matter how strenuously and self sacrificingly they may fight the police and the troops no matter how revolutionary they may act will prove to be merely a force supporting these revolutionaries the rearguard of bourgeois democracy and not the social democratic vanguard take for example the german social democrats whose weak sides alone our economists desire to emulate why is it that not a single political event takes place in germany without adding to the authority and prestige of social democracy because social democracy is always found to be in advance of all others in its revolutionary estimation of every event and in its championship of every protest against tyranny it does not soothe itself by arguments about the economic struggle bringing the workers up against their own lack of rights and about concrete conditions fatalistically impelling the labor movement onto the path of revolution it intervenes in every sphere and in every question of social and political life in the matter of wilhelm s refusal to endorse a bourgeois progressive as city mayor our economists have not yet managed to convince the germans that this in fact is a compromise with liberalism in the question of the law against the publication of immoral publications and pictures in the question of the government influencing the election of professors etc etc everywhere social democracy is found to be ahead of all others rousing political discontent among all classes rousing the sluggards pushing on the laggards and providing a wealth of material for the development of the political consciousness and political activity of the proletariat the result of all thisthe method of conducting business and the competence of the workers circles which are to be organized in every factory not more than ten persons and which elect central factory groups the central group says paragraph observes all that goes on in its factory or workshop and keeps a record of events the central group presents to the contributors a monthly report on the state of the funds par etc ten paragraphs are devoted to the district organization and nineteen to the highly complex interconnection between the committee of the workers organization and the committee of the st petersburg league of struggle delegates from each district and from the executive groups groups of propagandists groups for maintaining contact with the provinces and with the organization abroad and for managing stores publications and funds social democracy executive groups in relation to the economic struggle of the workers it would be difficult to find a more striking illustration than this of how the economists ideas deviate from social democracy to trade unionism and how foreign to them is the idea that a social democrat must concern himself first and foremost with an organization of revolutionaries capable of guiding the whole proletarian struggle for emancipation to talk of the political emancipation of the working class and the struggle against tsarist despotism and at the same time to draft rules like these indicates a complete failure to understand what the real political tasks of social democracy are not one of the fifty or so paragraphs reveals the slightest glimmer of understanding that it is necessary to conduct the widest possible political agitation among the masses an agitation that deals with every phase of russian absolutism and with every aspect of the various social classes in russia rules like these are of no use even for the achievement of trade union aims let alone political aims for that requires organization according to trade and yet the rules do not contain a single reference to this but most characteristic of all perhaps is the amazing top heaviness of the whole system which attempts to bind every factory with the committee by a permanent string of uniform and ludicrously petty rules and a three stage system of election hemmed in by the narrow outlook of economism the mind is lost in details which positively reek of red tape and bureaucracy in practice of course three fourths of the clauses are never applied on the other hand howeveralthough convenient for they sum up the main points are nevertheless inadequate because very important features of the phenomenon that has to be defined have to be especially deduced and so without forgetting the conditional and relative value of all definitions which can never include all the concatenations of a phenomenon in its complete development we must give a definition of imperialism that will embrace the following five essential features the concentration of production and capital developed to such a stage that it creates monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life the merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation on the basis of finance capital of a financial oligarchy the export of capital which has become extremely important as distinguished from the export of commodities the formation of international capitalist monopolies which share the world among themselves the territorial division of the whole world among the greatest capitalist powers is completed imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which thedomination of monopolies and finance capital has established itself in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun in which the partition of all the territories of the globe among the great capitalist powers has been completed we shall see later that imperialism can and must be defined differently if consideration is to be given not only to the basic purely economic factors to which the above definition is limited but also to the historical place of this stage of capitalism in relation to capitalism in general or to the relations between imperialism and the two main tendencies in the working class movement the point to be noted just now is that imperialism as interpreted above undoubtedly represents a special stage in the development of capitalism in order to enable the reader to obtain as well grounded an idea of imperialism as possible we deliberately quoted largely from bourgeois economists who are obliged to admit the particularly indisputable facts regarding modern capitalist economy with the same object in view we have produced detailed statistics which reveal the extent to which bank capital etc has developed showing how the transformation of quantity into quality of developed capitalism into imperialism has expressed itself needless to say all the boundaries in nature and in society are conditional and changeable and consequently it would be absurd to discuss the exact year or the decade in which imperialism definitely became established in this matter of defining imperialism

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can the value of labour power be made to sink and the portion of the working day necessary for the reproduction of that value be shortened the surplus value produced by prolongation of the working day i call absolute surplus value on the other hand the surplus value arising from the curtailment of the necessary labour time and from the corresponding alteration in the respective lengths of the two components of the working day i call relative surplus value in order to effect a fall in the value of labour power the increase in the productiveness of labour must seize upon those branches of industry whose products determine the value of labour power and consequently either belong to the class of customary means of subsistence or are capable of supplying the place of those means but the value of a commodity is determined not only by the quantity of labour which the labourer directly bestows upon that commodity but also by the labour contained in the means of production for instance the value of a pair of boots depends not only on the cobbler s labour but also on the value of the leather wax thread andc hence a fall in the value of labour power is also brought about by an increase in the productiveness of labour and by a corresponding cheapening of commodities in those industries which supply the instruments of labour and the raw material that form the material elements of the constant capital required for producing the necessaries of life but an increase in the productiveness of labour in those branches of industry which supply neither the necessaries of life nor the means of production for such necessaries leaves the value of labour power undisturbed the cheapened commodity of course causes only a pro tanto fall in the value of labour power a fall proportional to the extent of that commodity s employment in the reproduction of labour power shirts for instance are a necessary means of subsistence but are only one out of manya commodity can acquire a general expression of its value only by all other commodities simultaneously with it expressing their values in the same equivalent and every new commodity must follow suit it thus becomes evident that since the existence of commodities as values is purely social this social existence can be expressed by the totality of their social relations alone and consequently that the form of their value must be a socially recognised form all commodities being equated to linen now appear not only as qualitatively equal as values generally but also as values whose magnitudes are capable of comparison by expressing the magnitudes of their values in one and the same material the linen those magnitudes are also compared with each otherof tea yards of linen and lbs of coffee yards of linen therefore ibs of tea ibs of coffee in other words there is contained in lb of coffeeonly one fourth as much substance of value labour as is contained in lb of tea the general form of relative value embracing the whole world of commodities converts the single commodity that is excluded from the rest and made to play the part of equivalent here the linen into the universal equivalent the bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in common by the values of all commodities it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all and every of them the substance linen becomes the visible incarnation the social chrysalis state of every kind of human labour weaving which is the labour of certain private individuals producing a particular article linen acquires in consequence a social character the character of equality with all other kinds of labour the innumerable equations of which the general form of value is composed equate in turn the labour embodied in the linen to that embodied in every other commodity and they thus convert weaving into the general form of manifestation of undifferentiated human labour in this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is presented not only under its negative aspect under which abstraction is made from every concrete form and useful property of actual work but its own positive nature is made to reveal itself expressly the general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being human labour generally of being the expenditure of human labour power the general value form which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labour shows by its very structure that it is the social resume of the world of commodities that form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of commodities the character possessed by all labour of being human labour constitutes its specific social characterdoes no harm it simply serves as an abbreviation our analysis has shown that the form or expression of the value of a commodity originates in the nature of value and not that value and its magnitude originate in the mode of their expression as exchange value this however is the delusion as well of the mercantilists and their recent revivers ferrier ganilh and others as also of their antipodes the modern bagmen of free trade such as bastiat the mercantilists lay special stress on the qualitative aspect of the expression of value and consequently on the equivalent form of commodities which attains its full perfection in money the modern hawkers of free trade who must get rid of their article at any price on the other hand lay most stress on the quantitative aspect of the relative form of value for them there consequently exists neither value nor magnitude of value anywhere except in its expression by means of the exchange relation of commodities that is in the daily list of prices current macleod who has taken upon himself to dress up the confused ideas of lombard street in the most learned finery is a successful cross between the superstitious mercantilists and the enlightened free trade bagmen a close scrutiny of the expression of the value of a in terms of contained in the equation expressing the value relation of a to has shown us that within that relation the bodily form of a figures only as a use value the bodily form of only as the form or aspect of value the opposition or contrast existing internally in each commodity between use value and value is therefore made evident externally by two commodities being placed in such relation to each other that the commodity whose value it is sought to express figures directly as a mere use value while the commodity in which that value is to be expressed figures directly as mere exchange value hence the elementary form of value of a commodity is the elementary form in which the contrast contained in that commodity between use value and value becomes apparent every product of labour is in all states of society a use value but it is only at a definite historical epoch in a society s development that such a product becomes a commodity viz at the epoch when the labour spent on the production of a useful article becomes expressed as one of the objective qualities of that article e as its valuewe cannot reverse the equation as we can the equation yds of linen coat without altering its general character and converting it from the expanded form of value into the general form of value finally the form gives to the world of commodities a general social relative form of value because and in so far as thereby all commodities with the exception of one are excluded from the equivalent form a single commodity the linen appears therefore to have acquired the character of direct exchangeability with every other commodity because and in so far as this character is denied to every other commodity the commodity that figures as universal equivalent is on the other hand excluded from the relative value form if the linen or any other commodity serving as universal equivalent were at the same time to share in the relative form of value it would have to serve as its own equivalent we should then have yds of linen yds of linen this tautology expresses neither value nor magnitude of value in order to express the relative value of the universal equivalent we must rather reverse the form this equivalent has no relative form of value in common with other commodities but its value is relatively expressed by a never ending series of other commodities thus the expanded form of relative value or form now shows itself as the specific form of relative value for the equivalent commodity transition from the general form of value to the money formthe universal equivalent form is a form of value in general it can therefore be assumed by any commodity on the other hand if a commodity be found to have assumed the universal equivalent form form c this is only because and in so far as it has been excluded from the rest of all other commodities as their equivalent and that by their own act and from the moment that this exclusion becomes finally restricted to one particular commodity from that moment only the general form of relative value of the world of commodities obtains real consistence and general social validity the particular commodity with whose bodily form the equivalent form is thus socially identified now becomes the money commodity or serves as money it becomes the special social function of that commodity and consequently its social monopoly to play within the world of commodities the part of the universal equivalent amongst the commodities which in form figure as particular equivalents of the linen and in form express in common their relative values in linenit is evident that the duration of the surplus labour is given when the length of the working day and the value of labour power are given the value of labour power e the labour time requisite to produce labour power determines the labour time necessary for the reproduction of that value if one working hour be embodied in sixpence and the value of a day s labour power be five shillings the labourer must work hours a day in order to replace the value paid by capital for his labour power or to produce an equivalent for the value of his daily necessary means of subsistence given the value of these means of subsistence the value of his labour power is given and given the value of his labour power the duration of his necessary labour time is given the duration of the surplus labour however is arrived at by subtracting the necessary labour time from the total working day ten hours subtracted from twelve leave two

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the concept of difference was thereby confused with a simply conceptual difference and difference was thereby understood within identity since the concept in general was only the manner in which the principle of identity was deployed within representation repetition for its part could no longer be defined as other than a difference without concept this definition obviously continued to presuppose the identity of the concept for that which was repeated but instead of inscribing the difference within the concept it placed it outside the concept in the form of a numerical difference and placed the concept itself outside itself as existing in as many exemplars as there were numerically distinct cases or times it thereby invoked an external force a form of exteriority capable of putting difference outside the identical concept and the identical concept outside itself by blocking its specification in the same way as an internal force or form of inferiority capable of putting difference into the concept and the concept into itself by means of a continued specification was invoked earlier it was therefore at the same time and from the same point of view that the supposed identity of the concept integrated and internalised difference in the form of conceptual difference while on the contrary projecting repetition as a correlative difference but without concept and explained negatively or by default however if everything is related in this chain of confusions so must everything be related in the rectification of difference and repetition ideas are not concepts they are a form of eternally positive differential multiplicity distinguished from the identity of concepts instead of representing difference by subordinating it to the identity of concepts and thereby to the resemblance of perception the opposition of predicates and the analogy of judgement they liberate it and cause it to evolve in positive systems in which different is related to different making divergence disparity and decentring so many objects of affirmation which rupture the framework of conceptual representation the powers of repetition include displacement and disguise just as difference includes power of divergence and decentring the one no less than the other belongs to ideas for ideasno morethe two repetitions enter into so many different relations that it would require an extremely systematic clinical study of a kind yet to be undertaken in order to distinguish the cases which correspond to their possible combinations consider the gestural or linguistic repetitions and iterations or stereotypical behaviours associated with dementia and schizophrenia these no longer seem to manifest a will capable of investing an object within the context of a ceremony rather they function like reflexes which indicate a general breakdown of investment whence the impossibility for patients to repeat at will in the tests to which they are subjected it is nevertheless the case that involuntary repetition depends not upon aphasic or amnesiac difficulties as a negative explanation would suggest but on subcortical lesions and thymic disorders is this another way of explaining repetition negatively as though the patient reverted through degeneration to primitive non integrated circuits in fact in cases of iterations and even of stereotypes we should note the constant presence of contractions which show up at least in parasitic vowels or consonants contraction continues to have two aspects one by which it bears upon a physical element of repetition which it modifies the other by which it concerns a psychic totality which is repeatable in different degrees in this sense we can recognise a persistent intentionality in every stereotype even in a schizophrenic grinding of the jaws this intentionality amounts to investing the entire psychic life in a fragment gesture or word in the absence of any other object of investment these in turn becoming the elements of the other repetition for example the patient who turns ever more rapidly on one foot the other leg extended in such a way as to repel any person approaching from behind thereby miming his horror of women and his fear of being surprised by them the properly pathological aspect lies in the fact that on the one hand the contraction no longer ensures a resonance between two or more levels simultaneously playable in differenciated manners but rather crushes them all and compresses them into the stereotypical fragment on the other hand contraction no longer draws from the element a difference or modification which would permit repetition within a space and time organised by the will on the contrary it makes the modification itself the element to be repeated taking itself as object in an acceleration which precisely renders impossible any bare repetition of elements thus in these cases of iteration and stereotype we see not an independence of purely mechanical repetition but rather a specific difficulty in the relation between the two repetitions and in the process by which one is and remains the cause of the other repetition is the power of language and far from being explicable in negative fashion by some default on the part of nominal concepts it implies an always excessive idea of poetry the coexistent levels of a psychic totality may be considered to be actualised in differenciated series according to the singularities which characterise them these series are liable to resonate under the influence of a fragment or dark precursor which stands for this totality in which all the levels coexist each series is therefore repeated in the other at the same time as the precursor is displaced from one level to another and disguised in all the series it therefore does not belong to any level or degree in the case of verbal series we call a word which designates the sense of a preceding word a word of higher degree however the linguistic precursor the esoteric or poetic word par excellence objecthow then are we to avoid this profound repetition being hidden by the bare repetitions that it inspires and succumbing to the illusion of a primacy of brute repetition in the same movement the ground falls back into the representation of what it grounds while the circles begin to turn in the manner of the same for this reason it always seemed to us that the circles were unravelled in a third synthesis where the ground was abolished in a groundlessness the ideas were separated from the forms of memory and the displacement and disguise of repetition engaged divergence and decentring the powers of difference beyond the cycles the at first straight line of the empty form of time beyond memory the death instinct beyond resonance forced movement beyond bare repetition and clothed repetition beyond that from which difference is drawn and that which includes it a repetition which makes the difference beyond the grounded and grounding repetitions a repetition of ungrounding on which depend both that which enchains and that which liberates that which dies and that which lives within repetition beyond physical repetition and psychic or metaphysical repetition an ontological repetition the role of the latter would not be to suppress the other two but on the one hand to distribute difference to them in the form of difference drawn off or included and on the other hand to produce the illusion by which they are affected while nevertheless preventing them from developing the related error into which they fall in a certain sense the ultimate repetition the ultimate theatre therefore encompasses everything while in another sense it destroys everything and in yet another sense selects among everything perhaps the highest object of art is to bring into play simultaneously all these repetitions with their differences in kind and rhythm their respective displacements and disguises their divergences and decentrings to embed them in one another and to envelop one or the other in illusions the effect of which varies in each case art does not imitate above all because it repeats it repeatsthe right direction this condition grounds prediction itself it has often been noticed that if initially indistinguishable temperatures are allowed to differenciate it cannot be predicted which will increase or decrease and if viscosity is accelerated it will tear moving bodies from their state of rest but in an unpredictable direction well known pages by boltzmann comment upon this scientific and thermodynamic guarantee of good sense they show how within a partial system difference the improbable and the past are identified on the one hand while uniformity the probable and the future are identified on the other in the dream of a truly universal good sense one which attaches the feeling of the absolute to partial truths along with the moon to the earth this equalisation and homogenisation do not occur only in each partial system but continue from one system to another however as boltzmann shows this attachment is not legitimate any more than this synthesis of time is sufficient we are at least in a position to clarify the relation between good sense and common sense common sense was defined subjectively by the supposed identity of a self which provided the unity and ground of all the faculties and objectively by the identity of whatever object served as a focus for all the faculties this double identity however remains static we no more find ourselves before a universal indeterminate object than we are a universal self objects are divided up in and by fields of individuation as are selves common sense must therefore point beyond itself towards another dynamic instance capable of determining the indeterminate object as this or that and of individualising the self situated in this ensemble of objects this other instance is good sense which takes its point of departure from a difference at the origin of individuation however precisely because it ensures the distribution of that difference in such a manner that it tends to be cancelled in the object and because it provides a rule according to which the different objects tend to equalise themselves and the different selves tend to become uniform good sense in turn points towards the instance of a common sense which provides it with both the form of a universal self and that of an indeterminate object good sense therefore has two definitions one objective and one subjective which correspond to those of common sense a rule of universal distribution andthe second illusion already prepared us for this discovery of a mystification on the part of the negative it is in quality and extensity that intensity is inverted and appears upside down and its power of affirming difference is betrayed by the figures of quantitative and qualitative limitation qualitative and quantitative opposition limitation and opposition are first and second dimension surface effects whereas the living depths the diagonal is populated by differences without negation beneath the platitude of the negative lies the world of disparateness the origin of the illusion which subjects difference to the false power of the negative must therefore be sought not in the sensible world itself but in that which acts in depth and is incarnated in the sensible world we have seen that ideas are genuine objectivities made up of differential elements and relations and provided with a specific mode namely the problematic problems thus defined do not designate any ignorance on the part of a thinking subject any more than they express a conflict but rather objectively characterise the nature of ideas as such there is indeed therefore a me on which must not be confused with the ouk on and which means the being of the problematic and not the being of the negative an expletive rather than a negative not this me on is so called because it precedes all affirmation but is none the less completely positive problems ideas are positive multiplicities full and differentiated positivities described by the process of complete and reciprocal determination which relates problems to their conditions the positivity of problems is constituted by the fact of being posited thereby being related to their conditions and fully determined it is true that from this point of view problems give rise to propositions which give effect to them in the form of answers or cases of solution these propositions in turn represent affirmations the objects of which are those differences which correspond to the relations and the singularities of the differential field in this sense we can establish a distinction between the positive and the affirmative in other words between the positivity of ideas understood as differential positings and the affirmations to which they give rise which incarnate and solve them with regard to the latter we should say not only that they are different affirmations but that they are affirmations of differences as a consequence of the multiplicity which belongs to each idea affirmation understood as the affirmation of difference is produced by the positivity of problems understood as differential positings multiple affirmation is produced by problematic multiplicity it is of the essence of affirmation to be in itself multiple and to affirm difference as for the negative

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the very status of what is called the psyche this absolute separation this natural atheism this lying freedom in which truth and discourse take root all this is a great glory for the creator an affirmation which for once at least is hardly disorienting for the face to present the other without metaphor speech must not only translate thought thought of course already must be speech but above all the body must also remain a language rational knowledge must not be the first word of words if one is to believe levinas husserl and heidegger at bottom accepted the classical subordination of language to thought and body to language on the contrary merleauponty better than others would have shown that disincarnated thought thinking of speech before speaking it thought as constitutive of the world of speech was a myth but by the force of a movement proper to levinas he accepts this extreme modern audacity only to redirect it toward an infinitism that this audacity itself must suppose according to himself and the form of this infinitism is often quite classical pre kantian rather than hegelian thus the themes of one s own body as language and as intentionality cannot get around the classical dangers and thought cannot first be language unless it is acknowledged that thought is first and irreducibly a relation to the other which it seems to us did not escape merleau ponty but a relation to an irreducible other who summons me without possibility of return from without for in this order is presented the infinity which no thought can enclose and which forbids all monologue even if it had the corporal intentionality of merleau ponty despite all appearances and all habitual thinking it must be acknowledged here that the dissociation of thought and language and the subordination of the latter to the former are proper to a philosophy of finitude and this demonstration would refer us once more to the cartesian cogito of the third meditation beyond merleau ponty heidegger and husserl and does so according to a schema that seems to us to support the entirety of levinas s thought the other is the other only if his alterity is absolutely ities through its freedom of speech the face is not of this worldcan only indefinitely tend toward justice by acknowledging and practicing the violence within it violence against violence economy of violence an economy irreducible to what levinas envisions in the word if light is the element of violence one must combat light with a certain other light in order to avoid the worst violence the violence of the night which precedes or represses discourse this vigilance is a violence chosen as the least violence by a philosophy which takes history that is finitude seriously a philosophy aware of itself as historical in each of its aspects in a sense which tolerates neither finite totality nor positive infinity and aware of itself as levinas says in another sense as economy but again an economy which in being history can be at home neither in the finite totality which levinas calls the same nor in the positive presence of the infinite speech is doubtless the first defeat of violence but paradoxically violence did not exist before the possibility of speech the philosopher man must speak and write within this war of light a war in which he always already knows himself to be engaged a war which he knows is inescapable except by denying discourse that is by risking the worst violence this is why this avowal of the war within discourse an avowal which is not yet peace signifies the opposite of bellicosity the bellicosity and who has shown this better than hegel whose best accomplice within history is irenics within history which the philosopher cannot escape because it is not history in the sense given to it by levinas totality but is the history of the departures from totality history as the very movement of transcendence of the excess over the totality without which no totality would of transcendental violencein addition metaphysics unable to escape its ancestry in light always supposes a phenomenology in its very critique of phenomenology and especially if like levinas s metaphysics it seeks to be discourse and instruction does metaphysics suppose this phenomenology only as a method as a technique in the strict sense of these words although he rejects the majority of the literal results of husserl s researches levinas keeps to the methodological inheritance the presentation and development of the notions employed owes everything to the phenomenological method but are not the presentation and development of ideas but the vestments of thought and can a method be borrowed like a tool thirty years earlier in the wake of heidegger did not levinas maintain that method cannot be isolated for methodthe symptomatic form of the return of the repressed the metaphor of writing which haunts european discourse and the systematic contradictions of the ontotheological exclusion of the trace the repression of writing as the repression of that which threatens presence and the mastering of absence the enigma of presence pure and simple as duplication original repetition auto affection and differance the distinction between the mastering of absence as speech and the mastering of absence as writing the writing within speech hallucination as speech and hallucination as writing the relationship between phone and consciousness the freudian concept of verbal representation as preconsciousness logophonocentrism is not a philosophical or historical error which the history of philosophy of the west that is of the world would have rushed into pathologically but is rather a necessary and necessarily finite movement and structure the history of the possibility of symbolism in general before the distinction between man and animal and even before the distinction between the living and the nonliving the history of differance history as differance which finds in philosophy as episteme in the european form of the metaphysical or onto theological project the privileged manifestation with worldwidedominance of dissimulation of general censorship of the text in general an attempt to justify a theoretical reticence to utilize freudian concepts otherwise than in quotation marks all these concepts without exception belong to the history of metaphysics that is to the system of logocentric repression which was organized in order to exclude or to lower to put outside or below the body of the written trace as a didactic and technical metaphor as servile matter or excrement for example logocentric repression is not comprehensible on the basis of the freudian concept of repression on the contrary logocentric repression permits an understanding of how an original and individual repression became possible within the horizon of a culture and a historical structure of belonging why it is a question neither of following jung nor of following the freudian concept of the hereditary mnemic trace certainly freudian discourse in its syntax or if you will its labor is not to be confused with these necessarily metaphysical and traditional concepts certainly it is not exhausted by belonging to them witness the precautions and the nominalism with which freud manipulates what he calls conventions and conceptual hypotheses and a conception of difference is attached less to concepts than to discourse but freud never reflected upon the historical and theoretical sense of these precautions the necessity of an immense labor of deconstruction of the metaphysical concepts and phrases that are condensed and sedimented within freud s precautions the metaphysical complications of psychoanalysis and the so called human or social sciences the concepts of presence perception reality etc linguistic phonologismimpas iveness heretofore have been the targets of the classical objections against theoretism and objectivism on the contrary there will be more force and danger in denouncing the blindness of theoretism its inability to depart from itself towards absolute exteriority towards the totally other the infinitely other more objective than objectivity the complicity of theoretical objectivity and mystical communion will be levinas s true target the premetaphysical unity of one and the same violence an alternation which always modifies the same confinement of the other in levinas turns toward heidegger against husserl sein and zeit is published and heidegger s teaching begins to spread everything which overflows the commentary and letter of husserl s texts moves toward ontology in the very special sense heidegger gives to the term theorie de intuition hereafter in his critique of husserl levinas retains two heideggerean themes despite the idea so profound that in the ontological order the world of science is posterior to the concrete and vague world of perception and depends upon it husserl perhaps was wrong to see in this concrete world a world of perceived objects above all heidegger goes further since for him this world is not primarily given over to the glance but is ratherand we wonder whether heidegger would have accepted this formulation in its very being like a center of action a field of activity or of solicitude ibid if husserl was right in his opposition to historicism and naturalistic history he neglected the historical situanon of man understood in another sense there exist a histor philosophy enveloped in its own fundamental conceptions a contra diction according to what levinas often will call formal logic let us follow this displacement the respectful moderate reproach directed against husserl in a heideggerean style will soon become the main charge of an indictment this time directed against heidegger and made with a violence that will not cease to grow certainly it is not a question of denouncing as militant theoretism a thought which in its initial act refused to treat the self evidence of the object as its ultimate recourse a thought for which the historicity of meaning according to levinas s own terms destroys clarity and constitution as authentic modes of the existence of the mindexistence hereafter and for which finally the self evident is no longer the fundamental mode of intellection for which existence is irreducible to the light of the self evident and the drama of existence is played out before light ibid nevertheless at a singular depth butit is true that to go toward the necessary beginning of wandering as history that is to say the very dissimulation of wandering the nonquestion of which we are speaking is not yet a dogma and the act of faith in the book can precede as we know belief in the bible and can also survive it the nonquestion of which we are speaking is the unpenetrated certainty that being is a grammar and that the world is in all its parts a cryptogram to be constituted or reconstituted through poetic inscription or deciphering that the book is original that everything belongs to the book before being and in order to come into the world that any thing can be born only by approaching the book can die only by failing in sight of the book and that always the impassible shore of the book is first but what if the book was only in all senses of the word an epoch of being an epoch coming to an end which would permit us to see being in the glow of its agony or the relaxation of its grasp and an end which would multiply like a final illness like the garrulous and tenacious hypermnesia of certain moribunds books about the dead book if the form of the book was no longer to be the model of meaning if being was radically outside the book outside its letter and was such by virtue of a transcendence which could no longer be touched by inscription and signification a transcendence which would no longer lie on the page and which above all would have arisen before it if being lost itself in books if books were the dissipation of being if the being of the world its presence and the meaning of its being revealed itself only in illegibility in a radical illegibility which would not be the accomplice of a lost or sought after legibility of a page not yet cut from jaspers s expression the manuscript of another but primarily the other of every possible manuscript and if it were always too soon to say revolt is page crumpled in the waste basket p and always too soon to say that evil is only indecipherable due to the effect of some lapsus calami or of god s cacography and that our life within evil has the form of an and if death did not let itself be inscribed in the book in which as is names of those who may live and if the dead soul were more or less something other in any event than the dead letter of the law which should always be capable of being reawakened the dissimulation of an older or younger writing from an age other than the age of the book the age of grammar the age of everything announced under s the heading of the meaning of being the dissimulation of a still illegible writing the radical illegibility of which we are speaking

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one entry signed by a doctor states we have seen and visited the person named charles dormont and after examining his bearing and the movement of his eyes taking his pulse and watching his behaviour interrogating him in diverse manners and weighing up his replies we are unanimously convinced that dormont has lost his wits and fallen into a total and absolute dementia and imbecility reading that text one has the impression that these were two uses and almost two levels of medical elaboration according to whether it is involved in the context of the law or as part of the social practice of confinement in the one instance it assesses the mental faculties of a subject of the law and thereby lays the groundwork for a psychology that blends a philosophical analysis of the faculties and a juridical analysis of the ability to make and honour contracts in an ambiguous unity and in that respect it concerns the delicate structures of civil liberty in the other it measures social behaviour and paves the way for a dualist pathology that will divide everything into binary oppositions normal and abnormal healthy and sick to create two radically differentdomains separated by the simple formula good for confinement the rougher structuring of social freedom the eighteenth century saw numerous attempts to adapt the ancient juridical notion of a subject of the law to the contemporary experience of man in society the political thought of the enlightenment postulated a fundamental unity between the two and a constant possibility of resolving any practical conflicts that might emerge such notions quietly led to an elaboration of the notion of madness and the organisation of the relevant practices the positivist medicine of the nineteenth century inherited these aufkl rung ideas and took it as an established and proven fact that the alienation of legal subjects should coincide with the madness of social man in a unified pathological reality which could be analysed in legal terms as well as perceived by the most immediate forms of social sensibility mental illness which medicine took as an object was slowly constituted as a mythical unity between a legally irresponsible subject and a man who troubled the social order all under the influence of the political and moral thought of the eighteenth century that new unity was already apparent shortly before the revolution when in the minister breteuil decided that the confinement of the mad should be preceded by a more careful judicial procedure that involved interdiction and an examin ation of the extent to which the person in question could be considered responsible before the law with regard to people for whom confinement is requested after they have lost their wits he wrote to the regional intendants of justice justice and prudence require that the king s orders be carried out only when the judgement that was passed proposes an interdiction these liberal gestures in the last years of the absolute monarchy were continued by the civil code that came into operation after the revolution where interdiction was an indispensable requirement for confinement the moment when the jurisprudence of alienation becomes the necessary condition for confinement is also the moment when pinel and the psychiatry that was beginning to emerge claim to treat the mad as human beings for the first time what pinel and his colleagues felt to be a discovery for both philanthropy and science was at bottom little more than the reconciliation of the divided consciousness of the previous century building the confinement of social man into the interdiction of the juridical subject meant that for the first time the alienated were recognised as being both incapable and mad their eccentricity which was immediately perceived by society limited their juridical existence but did not obliterate it altogether by that fact the two uses of medicine were reconciled the one which attempted to delineate the delicate structures of responsibility and the other which only helps bring the social decree of confinement all of which was of the utmost importance for subsequent developments in the medicine of the mind in its positivist incarnation this was little more than the combination of the two experiences that classicism had juxtaposed without ever joining them together a social normative and dichotomous experience of madness that revolved entirely around the imperative of confinement formulated in a style as simple as yes or no dangerous or harmless and good or not good for confinement and a finely differentiated qualitative juridical experience well aware of limits and degrees which looked into all the aspects of the behaviour of the subject for the polymorphous incarnations that insanity might assume the psychopathology of the nineteenth century and perhaps our own too even now believes that it orients itself and takes its bearings in relation to a homo natura or a normal manpre existing all experience of mental illnesswhat depth what fluidity what particular structure meant that it constantly eluded this project that was essential to the medical thought of the eighteenth century the classificatory activity came up against solid resistance as if to indicate that the project to divide up the various forms of madness according to their signs and manifestations contained within it a sort of contradiction as though the relationship between madness and its visible forms was neither one of essence nor one of truth that much becomes apparent when one follows the thread of the classifications from their general order through to the detail of the diseases that were classed there is always a moment where the great positivist theme classification in accordance with visible signs is rerouted or finds an obstacle in its path a separate principle surreptitiously creeps in altering the sense of the organisation and placing between madness and its perceptible figures either a series of moral denunciations or a system of causes madness alone cannot speak for its manifestations and forms an empty space where all is possible except a logical ordering of that possible space the origin and significance of the order are thus to be sought outside that order these heterogeneous principles will necessarily tell us a lot about the experience of madness in the medical thought of the eighteenth century in principle a classification should only examine the powers of the human spirit in the disorders to which it is prey but let us take one example thomas arnold taking his inspiration from locke perceived the possibility of madness according to the two major faculties of the mind one form was related to ideasis the distillation of the long process of reflection that began with erasmus the discovery of a form of madness immanent within reason and from there a process of doubling on the one hand a mad madness that turns its back on the madness that properly belongs to reason and which through that rejection redoubles its power and through that redoubling falls into the simplest most hermetic and most immediate forms of madness and on the other hand a wise madness which welcomes the madness of reason listens to it recognises its right of abode and allows itself to be penetrated by all its vivid power thereby protecting itself from madness in a manner far more effective than any obstinate refusal which is condemned to failure in advance now the truth of madness is at one with the victory of reason and its definitive mastery for the truth of madness is to be interior to reason to be one of its figures a strength and a momentary need to ascertain itself perhaps that provides one explanation for its multiple presence in the literature of the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century an art which in its effort to master this reason in search of itself recognises the presence of madness its own madness circumscribes it invests itself in it and finally triumphs over itthe new school would be the temple of nature there one would learn not what the old masters thought they knew but hat form of truth open to all that is manifested in everyday practice practice will be linked to theoretical precepts pupils will be practised in chemical experiments anatomical disseclions surgical operations and in the use of machinery read little see much and do much they will learn as they practise at the patient s bedside instead of useless physiologies they will learn the true art of curing the clinic figures then as a structure that is essential to the scientific coherence and also to the social utility and political purity of the new medical organization it represents the truth of that organization in guaranteed liberty fourcroy proposed that in three hospitals the hospice de humanite the hospice de unite and the hopital de ecole the clinical teaching should be entrusted to professors who would be sufficiently well paid to be able to devote themselves to the task entirely the public would be freely admitted to the new school of health in this way it was hoped that all those who practised medicine without proper training would come of their own free will to complete their experience in any case in each district pupils would be chosen who had shown good conduct pure morals love of the republic and a hatred of tyrants sufficient education and above all a knowledge of some of the sciences that might serve as a preliminary to the art of curing and they would be sent to the ecole centrale de medecine to be trained over a period of three years as officers of health for the provinces fourcroy proposed that there should be only special schools the deputies from the south of france objected and insisted that montpellier should also have its ecole centrale then ehrman demanded the same privilege for strasbourg with the result that the law of frimaire year provided for the setting up of three schools of medicine each providing a course of teaching lasting three years in paris the beginners class would study anatomy physiology and medical chemistry during the first semester and materia medica botany and physics during the second throughout the year the students would visit hospitals in order to get used to seeing the sick and how they are treated second year students would study first anatomy physiology chemistry pharmacy and surgery then materia rnedica internal and external pathology during this second year students might be employed in the hospitals in the service of the sick in the final year the students would revise what they had learnt in the first two years and benefitting from the hospital experience already gained begin their real clinical training the students would be distributed among three hospitals in each of which they would remain four months then move on the clinical training consisted of two parts the professor would pause at the bedside of each patient long enough to question him and examine him properly he would draw the students attention to the diagnostic signs and the important symptoms of the disease then in the lecture hall the professor would take up the general history of the illnesses observed in the hospital wardthis strange dialectical movement explains all the inhuman aspects of confinement the free animality of madness could only be tamed and not so that the beast might become human again but to restitute man to what is exclusively animal in him madness unveiled a secret of animality which is its truth and in which in some sense it is resorbed in the middle period of the eighteenth century a scottish farmer named gregory had his moment of fame when he claimed to have the ability to cure mania pinel noted the colossal stature of the man his method was to employ the mad for the most menial tasks possible around the farm using some as beasts of burden and others asdomestic servants reducing them to obedience by a flurry of blows if they ever stepped out of line in this reduction to animality madness found its truth and its cure when the madman became a beast the animal presence in him removed the scandal of madness not because the beast had been silenced but because all humanity had been evacuated if a human being became a beast of burden the absence of reason followed the order of wisdom madness was cured when it was alienated in a thing that was nothing other than its own truth the moment would come when the idea of a mechanistic psychology would be derived from this animal nature of madness together with the idea that the different forms of madness can be compared to the great structures of animal life but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the animal face of madness was far from entailing a determinism of its manifestations on the contrary madness was a space of unpredictable liberty where frenzy was unleashed the only form of determinism possible was through the hoped for effects of constraint punishment and training animality did not lead so much towards the grand laws of nature and life as it did towards the myriad forms of the bestiary unlike the examples from the middle ages however which used symbolic figures to recount the metamorphoses of evil the classical bestiary was more abstract evil no longer stalked through its pages in fantastical guises

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an object extended coloured and moved this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple constituent parts and viewing each by itself exclusive of the rest does frame the abstract ideas of extension colour and motion not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension but only that the mind can frame to itself by the idea of colour exclusive of extension and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension again the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something and alike and some other things peculiar as this or that figure or magnitude which distinguish them one from another it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common making thereof a most abstract idea of extension which is neither line surface nor solid nor has any figure or magnitude but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these so likewise the mind by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another and retaining that only which is makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red nor blue nor white nor any other determinate colour and in like manner by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body moved but likewise from the figure it describes and all particular directions and velocities the abstract idea of motion is framed which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense vide reid on the intellectual powers of man essay chap sec and as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or so does it by the same precision or mental separation attain abstract ideas of the more compounded which include several coexistent qualities for example the mind having observed that peter james and john resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of peter james and any other particular man that which is peculiar to each retaining only what is common to allbut i shall explain my meaning a human spirit or person is not perceived by sense as not being an idea when therefore we see the colour size figure and motions of a man we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves hence it is plain we do not see a man if by man is meant that which lives moves perceives and thinks as we do but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like to ourselves accompanying and represented by it and after the same manner we see god all the difference is that whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind whithersoever we direct our view we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the divinity everything we see hear feel or anywise perceive by sense being a sign or effect of the power of god as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men it is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of god or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence in short in whom we live and move and have our being that the discovery of this great truth which lies so near and obvious to the mind should be attained to by the reason of so very few is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men who though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the deity are yet so little affected by them that they seem as it were blinded with excess of light butthey be variously combined together and to the end their use be permanent and universal these combinations must be made by rule and with wise contrivance by this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas which in effect is all that i conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that by discerning a figure texture and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies whether natural or artificial we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon or the nature of the thing hence it is evident that those things which under the notion of a cause co operating or concurring to the production of effects are altogether inexplicable and run us into great absurdities may be very naturally explained and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information and it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the author of nature that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle that supreme and wise spirit in whom we live move and have our being in the twelfth place it may perhaps be objected that though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert senseless extended solid figured movable substance existing without the mind such as philosophers describe matter yet if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension figure solidity and motion and say that he means only by that word

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a small removal has a greater influence in diminishing them in our common way of thinking we are placed in a kind of middle station betwixt the past and future and as our imagination finds a kind of difficulty in running along the former and a facility in following the course of the latter the difficulty conveys the notion of ascent and the facility of the contrary hence we imagine our ancestors to be in a manner mounted above us and our posterity to lie below us our fancy arrives not at the one without effort but easily reaches the other which effort weakens the conception where the distance is small but enlarges and elevates the imagination when attended with a suitable object as on the other hand the facility assists the fancy in a small removal but takes off from its force when it contemplates any considerable distance it may not be improper before we leave this subject of the will to resume in a few words all that has been said concerning it in order to set the whole more distinctly before the eyes of the reader what we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of mind when any good or evil is presented or any object which by the original formation of our faculties is fitted to excite an appetite by reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the former but such as operate more calmly and cause no disorder in the temper which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties both the causes and effects of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable and depend in a great measure on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual generally speaking the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will though it is often found that the calm ones when corroborated by reflection and seconded by resolution are able to controul them in their most furious movements what makes this whole affair more uncertain is that a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one either by a change of temper or of the circumstances and situation of the object as by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion by custom or by exciting the imagination upon the whole this struggle of passion and of reason as it is called diversifies human life and makes men so different not only from each other but also from themselves in different times philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension is easy to observe that the passions both direct and indirect are founded on pain and pleasure and that in order to produce an affection of any kind it is only requisite to present some good or evil upon the removal of pain and pleasure there immediately follows a removal of love and hatred pride and humility desire and aversion and of most of our reflective or secondary impressions the impressions which arise from good and evil most naturally and with the least preparation are the direct passions of desire and aversion grief and joy hope and fear along with volition the mind by an original instinct tends to unite itself with the good and to avoid the evil though they be conceived merely in idea and be considered as to exist in any future period of time but supposing that there is an immediate impression of pain or pleasure and that arising from an object related to ourselves or others this does not prevent the propensity or aversion with the consequent emotions but by concurring with certain dormant principles of the human mind excites the new impressions of pride or humility love or hatred that propensity which unites us to the object or separates us from it still continues to operate but in conjunction with the indirect passions which arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas these indirect passions being always agreeable or uneasy give in their turn additional force to the direct passions and encrease our desire and aversion to the object thus a suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty and this pleasure produces the direct passions or the impressions of volition and desire again when these cloaths are considered as belonging to ourself the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride which is an indirect passion and the pleasure which attends that passion returns back to the direct affections and gives new force to our desire or volition joy or hope when good is certain or probableit is always self which is the object of pride and humility and whenever the passions look beyond it is still with a view to ourselves nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon us that this proceeds from an original quality or primary impulse will likewise appear evident if we consider that it is the distinguishing characteristic of these passions unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind it coued never have any secondary ones because in that case it would have no foundation for action nor coued ever begin to exert itself now these qualities which we must consider as original are such as are most inseparable from the soul and can be resolved into no other and such is the quality which determines the object of pride and humility we may perhaps make it a greater question whether the causes that produce the passion be as natural as the object to which it is directed and whether all that vast variety proceeds from caprice or from the constitution of the mind this doubt we shall soon remove if we cast our eye upon human nature and consider that in all nations and ages the same objects still give rise to pride and humility and that upon the view even of a stranger we can know pretty nearly what will either encrease or diminish his passions of this kind if there be any variation in this particular it proceeds from nothing but a difference in the tempers and complexions of men and is besides very inconsiderable can we imagine it possible that while human nature remains the same men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power riches beauty or personal merit and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these advantages but though the causes of pride and humility be plainly natural we shall find upon examination that they are not original and that it is utterly impossible they should each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision and primary constitution of nature beside their prodigious number many of them are the effects of art and arise partly from the industry partly from the caprice and partly from the good fortune of men industry produces houses furniture cloaths caprice determines their particular kinds and qualities and good fortune frequently contributes to all this by discovering the effects that result from the different mixtures and combinations of bodies it is absurd therefore to imagine that each of these was foreseen and provided for by nature and that every new production of art which causes pride or humility instead of adapting itself to the passion by partaking of some general quality that naturally operates on the mind is itself the object of an original principle which till then lay concealed in the soul and is only by accident at last brought to light thus the first mechanic that invented a fine scritoire produced pride in him who became possest of it by principles different from those which made him proud of handsome chairs and tables as this appears evidently ridiculous we must conclude that each cause of pride and humility is not adapted to the passions by a distinct original quality but that there are some one or more circumstances common to all of them on which their efficacy depends besides we find in the course of nature that though the effects be many the principles from which they arise are commonly but few and simple and that it is the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality in order to explain every different operation how much more must this be true with regard to the human mind which being so confined a subject may justly be thought incapable of containing such a monstrous heap of principles as would be necessary to excite the passions of pride and humility were each distinct cause adapted to the passion by a distinct set of principles here therefore moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural with regard to astronomy before the time of the antients though sensible of that maxim contrived such intricate systems of the heavens as seemed inconsistent with true philosophy and gave place at last to something more simple and natural to invent without scruple a new principle to every new phaenomenon instead of adapting it to the old to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind are certain proofs that none of these principles is the just one and that we only desire by a number of falsehoods to cover our ignorance of the truththe persons of the three relations above mentioned this of causation is the most extensive two objects may be considered as placed in this relation as well when one is the cause of any of the actions or motions of the other as when the former is the cause of the existence of the latter for as that action or motion is nothing but the object itself considered in a certain light and as the object continues the same in all its different situations it is easy to imagine how such an influence of objects upon one another may connect them in the imagination we may carry this farther and remark not only that two objects are connected by the relation of cause and effect when the one produces a motion or any action in the other but also when it has a power of producing it and this we may observe to be the source of all the relation of interest and duty by which men influence each other in society and are placed in the ties of government and subordination a master is such a one as by his situation arising either from force or agreement has a power of directing in certain particulars the actions of another whom we call servant a judge is one who in all disputed cases can fix by his opinion the possession or property of any thing betwixt any members of the society when a person is possessed of any power there is no more required to convert it into action but the exertion of the will and that in every case is considered as possible and in many as probable especially in the case of authority where the obedience of the subject is a pleasure and advantage to the superior these are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion by which they are united in our memory a kind of which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural and to shew itself in as many and as various forms its effects are every where conspicuous but as to its causes they are mostly unknown and must be resolved into original qualities of human nature which i pretend not to explain nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher than to restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes and having established any doctrine upon a sufficient number of experiments rest contented with that when he sees a farther examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations in that case his enquiry would be much better employed in examining the effects than the causes of his principle amongst the effects of this union or association of ideas there are none more remarkable than those complex ideas which are the common subjects of our thoughts and reasoning and generally arise from some principle of union among our simple ideas these complex ideas may be divided into relations modes and substances we shall briefly examine each of these in order and shall subjoin some considerations concerning our general and particular ideas before we leave the present subject which may be considered as the elements of this philosophy the word is commonly used in two senses considerably different from each other either for that quality by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination andthey observe that we have a preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves now if we carefully examine these arguments we shall find that they prove nothing butthat ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions from which the are derived and which they represent i hope this clear stating of the question will remove all disputes concerning it and win render this principle of more use in our reasonings than it seems hitherto to have been since it appears that our simple impressions are prior to their correspondent ideas and that the exceptions are very rare method seems to require we should examine our impressions before we consider our ideas impressions way be divided into two kinds those of and those of the first kind arises in the soul originally from unknown causes the second is derived in a great measure from our ideas and that in the following order an impression first strikes upon the senses and makes us perceive heat or cold thirst or hunger pleasure or pain of some kind or other of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind which remains after the impression ceases and this we call an idea this idea of pleasure or pain when it returns upon the soul produces the new impressions of desire and aversion hope and fear which may properly be called impressions of reflexion because derived from it these again are copied by the memory and imagination and become ideas which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas so that the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas but posterior to those of sensation and derived from them the examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral and therefore shall not at present be entered upon and as the impressions of reflexion viz passions desires and emotions which principally deserve our attention arise mostly from ideas it will be necessary to reverse that method which at first sight seems most natural and in order to explain the nature and principles of the human mind give a particular account of ideas before we proceed to impressions for this reason i have here chosen to begin with ideas we find by experience that when any impression has been present with the mind it again makes its appearance there as an idea and this it may do after two different ways either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea or when it entirely loses that vivacity and is a perfect idea the faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner is called the and the other thethis is an argument which in every view we can examine it will be found perfectly unanswerable similar instances are still the first source of our idea of power or necessity at the same time that they have no influence by their similarity either on each other or on any external object we must therefore turn ourselves to some other quarter to seek the origin of that idea though the several resembling instances which give rise to the idea of power have no influence on each other and can never produce any new quality in the object which can be the model of that idea yet the observation of this resemblance produces a new impression in the mind which is its real model for after we have observed the resemblance in a sufficient number of instances we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant and to conceive it in a stronger light upon account of that relation this determination is the only effect of the resemblance and therefore must be the same with power or efficacy whose idea is derived from the resemblance the several instances of resembling conjunctions lead us into the notion of power and necessity these instances are in themselves totally distinct from each other and have no union but in the mind which observes them and collects their ideas necessity then is the effect of this observation and is nothing but an internal impression of the mind or a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another without considering it in this view we can never arrive at the most distant notion of it or be able to attribute it either to external or internal objects to spirit or body to causes or effects the necessary connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other the foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustomed union these are therefore the same the idea of necessity arises from some impression there is no impression conveyed by our senses which can give rise to that idea it must therefore be derived from some internal impression or impression of reflection there is no internal impression which has any relation to the present business but that propensity which custom produces to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant

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these collective ideas of substances the mind makes by its power of composition and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas united in one substance and as the mind by putting together the repeated ideas of unity makes the collective mode or complex idea of any number as a score or a gross andc so by putting together several particular substances it makes collective ideas of substances as a troop an army a swarm a city a fleet each of which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea in one view and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one as one ship or one atom nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea than how a man should make one idea it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men and consider it as one as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man and consider them all together as one artificial things that are made up of distinct substances are our collective ideas amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of artificial things at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances and in truth if we consider all these collective ideas aright as as they are united into so many single ideas they are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things very remote and independent on one another into one view the better to contemplate and discourse on them united into one conception and signified by one name for there are no things so remote nor so contrary which the mind cannot by this art of composition bring into one idea as is visible in that signified by the name the ideas whether simple or complex that the mind has of things as they are in themselves there are others it gets from their comparison one with anotherare not able all their lifetime to reckon or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers for he that will count twenty or have any idea of that number must know that nineteen went before with the distinct name or sign of every one of them as they stand marked in their order for wherever this fails a gap is made the chain breaks and the progress in numbering can go no further so that to reckon right it is required that the mind distinguish carefully two ideas which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of unit that it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations from an unit to that number and that not confusedly and at random but in that exact order that the numbers follow one another in either of which if it trips the whole business of numbering will be disturbed and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to number measures all measurables this further is observable in number that it is that which the mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable which principally are and and our idea of infinity even when applied to those seems to be nothing but the infinity of number for what else are our ideas of eternity and immensity but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion with the infinity of number in which we can come to no end of addition for such an inexhaustible stock number of all other our ideas most clearly furnishes us with as is obvious to every one for let a man collect into one sum as great a number as he pleases this multitude how great soever lessens not one jot the power of adding to it or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number where still there remains as much to be added as if none were taken out and this or if any one like the word better of numbers so apparent to the mind is that i think which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity of which more in the following chapter infinity in its original intention attributed to space duration and number he that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name oftheir rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law moral actions may be regarded wither absolutely or as ideas of relation to conceive rightly of moral actions we must take notice of them under this two fold consideration first as they are in themselves each made up of such a collection of simple ideas thus drunkenness or lying signify such or such a collection of simple ideas which i call mixed modes and in this sense they are as much ideas as the drinking of a horse or speaking of a parrot secondly our actions are considered as good bad or indifferent and in this respect they are it being their conformity to or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular good or bad and so as far as they are compared with a rule and thereupon denominated they come under relation thus the challenging and fighting with a man as it is a certain positive mode or particular sort of action by particular ideas distinguished from all others is called which when considered in relation to the law of god will deserve the name of sin to the law of fashion in some countries valour and virtue and to the municipal laws of some governments a capital crime in this case when the positive mode has one name and another name as it stands in relation to the law the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in substances where one name g is used to signify the thing to signify the relation the denominations of actions often mislead us but because very frequently the positive idea of the action and its moral relation are comprehended together under one name and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action and its moral rectitude or obliquity therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action and the reference it has to a rule by which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds and are forward to take names for things are often misled in their judgment of actions thus the taking from another what is his without his knowledge or allowance is properly called but that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral gravity of the action and to denote its contrariety to the law men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called stealing as an ill action disagreeing with the rule of right and yet the private taking away his sword from a madman to prevent his doing mischief though it be properly denominated stealing as the name of such a mixed mode yetthe greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of are yellowness great weight ductility fusibility and solubility in andc all united together in an unknownall which ideas are nothing elsebut so many relations to other substances and are not really in the gold considered barely in itself though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution whereby it has a fitness differently to operate and be operated on by several other substances a collective idea is one idea besides these complex ideas of several substances as of man horse gold violet apple andc the mind hath also complex ideas of substances which i so call because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together as united into one idea and which so joined are looked on as one the idea of such a collection of men as make an though consisting of a great number of distinct substances is as much one idea as the idea of a man and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever signified by the name is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it it sufficing to the unity of any idea that it be considered as one representation or picture though made up of ever so many particulars made by the power of composing in the mindthe consideration of those objects that produce it may well persuade us that this is the end or use of pain for though great light be insufferable to our eyes yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them because that causing no disorderly motion in it leaves that curious organ unarmed in its natural state but yet excess of cold as well as heat pains us because it is equally destructive to that temper which is necessary to the preservation of life and the exercise of the several functions of the body and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth or if you please a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds beyond all this we may find another reason why god hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain in all the things that environ and affect us and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with that we finding imperfection dissatisfaction and want of complete happiness in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him with whom there is fullness of joy and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore goodness of god in annexing pleasure and pain to our other ideas though what i have here said may not perhaps make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does which is the only way that we are capable of having them yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the sovereign disposer of all things may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts and the proper business of all understandings ideas of existence and unity and are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within when ideas are in our minds we consider them as being actually there as well as we consider things to be actually without us which is that they exist or have existence and whatever we can consider as one thing whether a real being or idea suggests to the understanding the idea of unity also isi can much easier conceive what a friend is than what god because the knowledge of one action or one simple idea is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation but to the knowing of any substantial being an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary a man if he compares two things together can hardly be supposed not to know what it is wherein he compares them so that when he compares any things together he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation i think on or have a name for g comparing two men in reference to one common parent it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers without having yet the perfect idea of a man for significant relative words as well as others standing only for ideas and those being all either simple or made up of simple ones it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to thus having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched i have a clear idea of the relation of and between the two cassiowaries in st james s park though perhaps i have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves relations all terminate in simple ideas thirdly though there be a great number of considerations

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a decision concerning the latter will depend upon whether or not i am able to comprehend myself as such a natural whole without also assuming that there are other wholes outside of me the question before us here is only how such a real whole can be explained from nature and which new predicates might be attributed to nature through such an explanation as soon as one demands that something be explained from nature one demands that it be explained through and on the basis of a law of physical and by no means moral necessity simply by claiming such explicability one is also claiming that nature necessarily organizes itself into real wholes that this necessity lies in the properties that absolutely pertain to nature and that a rational being is forced to think of nature in this manner and only in this manner one should therefore not employ an argument of lazy reason in order to have recourse to an intellect as the creator or the architect of the world among the reasons for not doing this is the fact that in the former case it is simply unthinkable that an intellect could create matter and in the latter case it is not yet conceivable how reason could have any influence on nature inasmuch as this is precisely what we have to explain here in partmoreover an intellect may put things together and combine them with one another forever what results from this is aggregation allegation but never fusion which presupposes an inner force in nature itself nor should one attempt to explain organization on the basis of mechanical laws mechanical laws involve an eternal pushing and shoving of matter attraction and repulsion and nothing else instead the law in question is an immanent law of nature a law that a rational being in order to explain itself must think when it thinks the concept of nature butsuch a law cannot be explained any further to do so would mean to derive it from the law of mechanism it is self evident that it is only from the point of view of ordinary consciousness or of science that this law is supposed to be absolute e incapable of further explanation it can certainly be explained from the transcendental point of view that is from the point of view of the wissenschaftslehre inasmuch as nature as a wholehe will not be acting morally whether someone actually fulfills his duty within his estate is therefore something that he alone can calculate before the witness of his own conscience the preceding remark has concerned the necessary form of the will with regard to the particular duties we still have to add another remark this one concerning the matter or content of the will with regard to the particular duties and this will also provide us with a criterion that will allow anyone to recognize whether or not he satisfies his obligations to his estate out of a love for duty to wit if one s estate and profession are absolutely not ends in themselves but only means for reaching an end then it is impermissible and contrary to duty to sacrifice one s virtue to one s estate and profession since it is absurd to put the means before the end the work prescribed by one s estate and profession as well as the rights that render such work possible can from time to time come into conflict with the end of reason in this case a person whose ultimate end is his estate and profession and who therefore pursues the latter for reasons other than from a feeling of duty will still continue to pursue this end because he is acquainted with no higher point of view whatsoever and knows only that he is supposed to do and to say this and that but a person who regards his estate and his profession as a means will in such cases of conflict between the end of reason and the requirements of his profession and estate certainly not continue to pursue them because now they no longer serve to advance the end of reason but hinder it instead in the course of the investigation that follows i will apply this general remark to the particular duties of individual estates and professions and show what it implies for each in this mannerdoes a manifold acting ein mannigfaltiges handeln arise since however as a whole which is what is demanded by the original drive is possible then all the parts of are also possible as well even in each individual case several different actions are possible in order for something to ensue however it must not merely be possible but i must also determine myself to act in this way nothing occurs through my drive that i do not will and among everything that is possible nothing occurs but what i will let us dwell a bit upon the concept of the manifold of what is possible in this case and let us consider it purely as such e ignoring the relationship of these possible actions to one another and not asking whether they exclude one another or contain and comprehend one another as parts of themselves since such questions that do not yet pertain to our inquiry among this manifold of actions that are possible in a particular case there is absolutely only one a determinate part of this manifold that is dutiful and everything else is contrary to duty in passing one should note that what is commanded always lies within the sphere of what is possible for it lies within the sphere of what is demanded by the original drive since the moral law is itself based on the original drive something impossible is never a duty and a duty is never impossible which of these possible ways of acting is the one that duty demands in the previous section we answered this question by referring to an inner feeling within our conscience in every case whatever is confirmed by this inner feelingthe object of our will is by no means determined by some possible enjoyment but is determined absolutely through the will with respect to its form therefore there is no difference between this way of thinking and the genuinely moral way of thinking furthermore this drive necessarily retains its character of demanding respect either on the one hand no sacrifice of enjoyment is required in order to act in accordance with this way of thinking either because one has no desires or because the circumstances do not require any sacrifice from us in this case one approves coldly and what one approves of is not one s own conduct for one has not reflected upon the latter as something subject to a rule instead what one approves of is the course of nature itself or our fellow human beings manner of acting one believed that one could demand that everything bow to one s will for thatis precisely the character of the drive to self sufficiency and thus according to this mode of thinking what happened in this case of approval was nothing more than what is right and in order no true pleasure nor joy is connected with such success since we did not expect any favor from nature but were only demanding that nature fulfill its obligation if however we fail to obtain what we desired what then arises is not pain and suffering which is a sad and disheartened feeling butannoyance which is an invigorating emotion andthen it is the duty of every private person to do all he can to frustrate the achievement of such an end and by no means to further it through thoughtless tender heartedness and poorly understood duty it goes without saying that one has to be certain before one s own conscience that one is not denying this benefit out of avarice and natural hard heartedness and only pretending to do this on the basis of this higher principle that this is not the case can easily be gathered from the fact that a person performs those works of reasonable beneficence described above whenever the occasion for doing so might present itself how far do those deviate from reason and truth who make almsgiving a religious exercise and who tolerate begging and even promote it so that believers will never lack occasions to do good deeds as though there were ever any lack of such occasions how far does the duty of beneficence extend is it sufficient to exercise this duty only to the extent that it does not cause us the least inconvenience and is it enough to give away only what we ourselves cannot use one owes it to oneself to make some cuts to restrict one s expenses to be more frugal economical and industrious so that one will then be able to be beneficent for a person without property has a claim to our property i will add the following in order to prevent anyone from inverting this proposition and concluding that the poor person is permitted to extort erzwingen support he is indeed permitted to extort this from the state were he able to do so it is a goal of both the poor and the rich to work for a situation in which the state will finally be brought to the point of knowing and performing its duty but so far as single individuals are concerned another person can never judge whether this is the duty of these individuals whether they are in a position to perform this duty or whether they may not be prevented from doing so by other higher duties everyone is supposed to keep what is his for otherwise his formal freedom would be disturbed hence it is my duty to protect another person s property against any attack even if i am not summoned to do this and to do so to the same extent to which i would defend my own property for the defense of both is a duty for the same reasonsomething that develops by itself without any assistance from a conscious being in which case the latter would only have to be an observer freedom is not the object but the subject object of a conscious being in this sense one does indeed become conscious of one s freedom through the deed that is by self actively tearing oneself loose from the state of wavering and by positing for oneself some determinate end simply because one posits it for oneself especially if the end in question runs counter to all one s inclinations and is nevertheless chosen for duty s sake such consciousness however involves both the energy of the will and the inwardness of intuition there are individuals who do not in fact really will but who always allow themselves to be pushed around and driven by a blind propensity for this reason such persons do not possess any consciousness properly speaking since they never self actively produce determine and arrange their representations but merely dream a long dream a dream determined by the obscure course of the association of ideas when we talk about the consciousness of freedom we are not addressing such people consciousness of my indeterminacy is therefore a condition for my consciousness of determining myself through free activity indeterminacy however is not simply not determinacy but is an undecided hovering between several possible determinations a negative magnitude for otherwise it could not be posited and would be nothing up to this point we have been unable to see how freedom can be directed toward several possible determinations and how it is supposed to be posited as directed toward them there is no object whatsoever for the application of freedom other than the natural drive when the latter comes upon the scene there is no reason at all why it should not obey freedom

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it is in this way alone that the qualities are determined they are not therefore a determinate being in general existing for each other but are rather posited as indivisible and the specific magnitude tied to them is a qualitative unity one determination of measure in which they are implicitly bound together in accordance with specific quantitytheir concept measure is thus the immanent quantitative relating of two qualities to each other in measure we have the essential determination of variable magnitude for measure is sublated quantum quantum therefore no longer as that which it ought to be in order to be quantum but quantum as quantum and as something other besides this other is the qualitative element and as we have established is nothing else than the relation of powers of the quantum in immediate measure this variability is not yet posited it is just one single quantum or other to which a quality is attached in the specifying of measure the preceding determination which is an alteration of the merely external quantum by the qualitative moment what is posited is the distinctness of two determinate magnitudes and hence in general the plurality of measures in one common external quantum and it is in this differentiation of the quantum from itself that the latter shows itself for the first time to be a real measure for it appears as a being which is one and the same e g the constant temperature of the medium and at the same time of diversified and indeed quantitative existence in the various temperatures of the bodies found in the medium this differentiation of quantum into the diverse qualities the different bodies yields a further form of measure one in which the two sides relate to each other as qualitatively determined quanta and this can be called the realized measure magnitude simply as such is alterable for its determinatenessthe external extensive side by contrast is to be represented as altering in the specified series but the direct ratio like velocity as such st is reduced here to a formal determination which has no concrete existence but belongs rather only to the abstraction of reflection and even though in the ratio of root and square as in the root is to be taken as an empirical quantum varying in an arithmetical progression the other side as specified instead the higher realization of the qualification of the quantitative moment one which would be more in keeping with the concept is this that both sides are related in higher determinations of powers as in the discussion here regarding the connection in measure between the qualitative nature of an existence and its quantitative determination has its application in the already cited example of motion first of all in the fact that in velocity as the direct ratio of traversed space and the elapsed time the magnitude of time is taken as denominator and that of space as numerator if velocity is as such only a ratio of the space and time of a motion it is then indifferent which of the two moments should be considered as the numerator and which as the unit but space like weight specific quantity in specific gravity is an external real whole as such and hence amount time like volume is on the contrary the ideal the negative the side of unity but the more important ratio the one essential to the point at issue here is the one that holds in free motion in the first instance in the still conditioned motion of a falling body where the quantitative values of time and space are reciprocally determined as root and square respectively and then in the absolutely free motion of the celestial bodies where the period of revolution and the distan are reciprocally determined the one as one power lower than the other as square and cube respectively fundamental relations of this kind rest on the nature of the related qualities of space and time and on the way they stand connected whether their motion is mechanical that is unfree or not determined by the concept of its moments or is the motion of a falling body that is conditionally free or the absolutely free motion of the heavensbut then if it is further said that matter cannot be there without the force of attraction this claim is based on a representation of matter drawn from perception the determination of attraction must therefore also be met with in perception and one can well perceive that besides its being for itself which sublates the being for other yields resistance matter also possesses the existent s connection with itself it possesses spatial extension and cohesion and a very stable cohesion indeed in rigidity and solidity physics explains that for the tearing apart etc of a body there is required a force which is stronger than the reciprocal attraction of the body s parts from this observation it is possible for reflection to infer attraction or to assume it as given just as immediately as it did for repulsion demonstration of the proposition that the possibility of matter requires a force of attraction as the second fundamental force loc cit we find that they contain nothing except that through mere repulsion matter would not be spatial in presupposing that matter fills space one attributes to it the continuity for which the force of attraction is assumed to be the base now even if such a so called construction of matter had at most analytical merit however diminished because of a flawed exposition the thought on which it is based namely that matter must be made out to be from these two opposing determinations as its fundamental forces must always be highly esteemed kant is primarily concerned to banish the ordinary mechanistic ways of representation that stop at the one determination of impenetrability of existents that subsist point like for themselves and reduce to something external the opposite determination the internal connection of matter or of a plurality of matters that are in turn regarded as particular ones these are ways of representation as kant says that would not make room for any other motive force except pressure and thrust that is except through influence from outside this externality of cognition presupposes motion as always already externally present in matter it does not occur to thought to grasp it as something internal to conceive it as itself in matter which for precisely that reason is assumed to be motionless and inert this standpoint has in view only ordinary mechanics not immanent and free motion while it is true that kant sublates that externality by making attraction a force of matter itself the attraction which is the reciprocal connections of matters inasmuch as these are assumed to be external to each other or the connection of matter in general in its self external being still within matter his two fundamental forces remain external independent of each other as null as is the independence attributed to these two forces from the standpoint of the said cognition just as nullmust any other would be fixed distinction made regarding their contentthe unity of the qualitative and the quantitative the two moments into which the general sphere of being is distinguished each as the beyond of the other in this way the perennial substrate begins to possess in it the determination of an existent infinity b this self sameness of the substrate is posited in that the qualitative independent measures into which the determining unit is dispersed consist of only quantitative differences so that the substrate persists while being internally distinguished in the infinite progression of the nodal series there is posited the continuation of the qualitative into the quantitative advance as into an indifferent alteration but equally too there is posited the negation of the qualitative contained in the progression and consequently at the same time of the merely quantitative externality the quantitative pointing beyond itself to an other which is itself quantitative perishes with the emergence of a measure relation of a quality and the qualitative transition is sublated in the very fact that the new quality is itself only a quantitative relation this reciprocal transition into the other of the qualitative and the quantitative moments occurs on the basis of their unity and the meaning of this process is only the existence which is the demonstration or the positing that such a substrate does underlie the process and is the unity of its moments in the series of independent measure relations the one sided members of the series are immediate qualitative somethings specific gravities or thisis a reminder at the end of the dialectic of being that the task we have been performing all along and are still engaged in at the moment is to bring stability to the fluidity of becoming we first did this with the category of existence or the being this or that dasein that first determination has now developed into an objective structure with an internal distinction between a permanent substrate and all the other determinations introduced so far under the rubrics of quality and quantity this distinction will next develop into the distinction between essence and being real measure chemical materials bases or alkalis acids for instance and their neutralizations by which we must understand here also the combinations of materials of different specific gravities are in turn self subsistent and themselves exclusive measure relationsa discrete magnitude is immediately only a differentiated many in general which if it were to have a limit as a many would be only an aggregate that is would be only indeterminately limited in order for quantum to be determinate the many must be concentrated into one and thereby be posited as identical with the limit continuous and discrete magnitude taken as quantum in general have each posited in it only one of the two sides by virtue of which quantum is fully determined and a number taken immediately this latter is extensive quantum the simple determinateness which is amount essentially but the amount of one and the same unit extensive quantum is distinguished from number only because in the latter the determinateness is explicitly posited as plurality however the determinateness through number how much there is of something does not require being distinguished from how much there quantum is of something else as if to the determinateness of one thingbelonged how much there is of it and how much there is of an other for the determinateness of magnitude as such is a limit determined for itself indifferent and simply self referring and in number this limit is posited as enclosed within the one existing for itselfis justified because in the triangle which has as its sides the element of an arc and the element of its abscissa and ordinate the relation is the same as if that element of the arc were the element of a straight line of the tangent the angles which constitute the essential relation that is that which remains to these elements when their respective finite magnitudes are abstracted from are the same this can also be expressed by saying that straight lines when infinitely small have passed over into curved lines that their relation in their infinity is a relation of curves since the straight line is by definition the shortest distance between two points its difference from the curved line is based on the determination of amount on the smaller number of what is differentiable in this distance a determination therefore of a quantum but this determination vanishes in the line when it is taken as an intensive magnitude as infinite moment as element and so does also its difference from the curved line which rested simply on a difference of quantum as infinite therefore the straight line and the arc no longer retain any quantitative relation and consequently by virtue of the assumed definition also no qualitative difference from each other either on the contrary the one passes over into the other similar to the equating of heterogeneous determinations but at the same time different from it is the assumption that infinitely small parts of a same whole are equal to each other by itself this assumption is indeterminate and completely indifferent but when applied to an object which is internally heterogeneous that is constrained by an essentially non uniform quantitative determination it produces the peculiar reversal contained in that proposition of higher mechanics according to which infinitely small parts of a curve are traversed in equal and infinitely small times in uniform motion where this is said of a motion in which in equal finite that is concretely existing parts of time finite that is concretely existing unequal parts of the curve are traversed that is is said of a motion which exists concretely as non uniform and is assumed to be such this proposition is the expression in words of what an analytical term such quantum as is obtained by the already cited expansion of the formula of a motion which is non uniform but otherwise conforms to is supposed to mean earlier mathematicians sought to express the results of the newly invented infinitesimal calculus which after all always had to do with concrete objects in words and propositions and to exhibit them in concrete geometrical constructions basically to use them as theorems in the ordinary method of proof the terms of the mathematical formula into which analysis transposed the magnitudes of the object of motion for instance were invested there with an objective meaning such as of velocity force of acceleration etc and in virtue of this meaning the terms were supposed to yield correct propositions physical laws and also in conformity with the analytical connectedness

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Summary as follows:

these rules are then not rules of taste but merely rules for establishing a union of taste with reason ie of the beautiful with the good rules by which the former becomes available as an intentional instrument in respect of the latter for the purpose of bringing that temper of the mind which is self sustaining and of subjective universal validity to the support and maintenance of that mode of thought which while possessing objective universal validity can only be preserved by a resolute effort but strictly speaking perfection neither gains by beauty nor beauty by perfection the truth is rather this when we compare the representation through which an object is given to us with the object in respect of what it is meant to be by means of a concept we cannot help reviewing it also in respect of the sensation in the subject hence there results a gain to the entire faculty of our power of representation when harmony prevails between both states of mind in respect of an object with a determinate internal end a judgement of taste would only be pure where the person judging either has no concept of this end or else makes abstraction from it in his judgement but in cases like this although such a person should lay down a correct judgement of taste since he would be judging the object as a free beauty he would still be censured by another who saw nothing in its beauty but a dependent quality i e who looked to the end of the object and would be accused by him of false taste though both would in their own way be judging correctly the one according to what he had present to his senses the other according to what was present in his thoughts this distinction enables us to settle many disputes about beauty on the part of critics for we may show them how one side is dealing with free beauty and the other with that which is dependent the former making a pure judgement of taste the latter an applied judgement taste the ideal of beauty there can be no objective rule of taste by which what is beautiful may be defined by means of concepts for every judgement from that source is aesthetic ie its determining ground is the feeling of the subject and not any concept of an object it is merely wasted labour to look for a principle of taste that affords a universal criterion of the beautiful by determinate concepts because what is sought is something impossible and inherently contradictory but in the universal communicability of the sensation of delight or aversion a communicability too that exists apart from any concept in the accord so far as possible of all ages and nations as to this feeling in the representation of certain objects we have the empirical criterion weak indeed and scarce sufficient to raise a presumption of the derivation of a taste thus confirmed by examples from a deep seated ground one shared alike by all human beings underlying their agreement in judging the forms under which objects are given to them for this reason some products of taste are looked on as exemplary not meaning thereby that by imitating others taste may be acquired for taste must be an intrinsically original faculty whereas one who imitates a model while showing skill commensurate with his success only displays taste in so far as he judges this model himself hence it follows that the highest model the archetype of taste is a mere idea which each person must produce in his own consciousness and according to which he must form his judgement of everything that is an object of taste or that is an example of critical taste and even of universal taste itself properly speaking an idea signifies a concept of reason and an ideal the representation of an individual existence as adequate to an idea hence this archetype of taste which rests indeed upon reason s indeterminate idea of a maximum but is not however capable of being represented by means of concepts but only in an individual presentation may more appropriately be called the ideal of the beautiful while not having this ideal in our possession we still strive to produce it within usbut what shows plainly that the principle of the ideality of the purposiveness in the beauty of nature is the one upon which we ourselves invariably take our stand in our aesthetic judgements forbidding us to have recourse to any realism of a natural end in favour of our faculty of representation as a principle of explanation is that in our general judging of beauty we seek its standard a priori in ourselves and that the aesthetic faculty is itself legislative in respect of the judgement whether anything is beautiful or not this could not be so on the assumption of a realism of the purposiveness of nature because in that case we should have to go to nature for instruction as to what we should deem beautiful and the judgement of taste would be subject to empirical principles for in such judging the question does not turn on what nature is or even on what it is for us in the way of an end but on how we receive it for nature to have fashioned its forms for our delight would inevitably imply an objective purposiveness on the part of nature instead of a subjective purposiveness resting on the play of imagination in its freedom where it is we who receive nature with favour and not nature that does us a favour that nature affords us an opportunity for perceiving the inner purposiveness in the relation of our mental powers engaged in the estimate of certain of its products and indeed such a purposiveness as arising from a supersensible basis is to be pronounced necessary and of universal validity is a property of nature which cannot belong to it as its end or rather cannot be judged by us to be such an end for otherwise the judgement that would be determined by reference to such an end would be grounded upon heteronomy instead of being grounded upon autonomy and being free as befits a judgement of taste the principle of the ideality of purposiveness is still more clearly apparent in fine art for the point that sensations do not enable us to adopt an aesthetic realism of purposiveness which would make art merely agreeable instead of beautiful is one which it enjoys in common with beautiful nature but the further point that the delight arising from aesthetic ideas must not be made dependent upon the successful attainment of determinate ends as an art mechanically directed to results and that consequently even in the case of the rationalism of the principle an ideality of the ends and not their reality is fundamental is brought home to us by the fact that fine art as such must not be regarded as a product of understanding and science but of genius and must therefore derive its rule from aesthetic ideas which are essentially different from rational ideas of determinate ends just as the ideality of objects of the senses as phenomena is the only way of explaining the possibility of their forms admitting of a priori determination so also the idealism of the purposiveness in judging the beautiful in nature and in art is the only hypothesis upon which a critique can explain the possibility of a judgement of taste that demands a priori validity for everyone yet without basing the purposiveness represented in the object upon concepts beauty as the symbol of morality intuitions are always required to verify the reality of our concepts if the concepts are empirical the intuitions are called examples if they are pure concepts of the understanding the intuitions go by the name of schemata but to call for a verification of the objective reality of rational concepts ie of ideas and what is more on behalf of the dialectic of aesthetic judgement theoretical cognition of such a reality is to demand an impossibility because absolutely no intuition adequate to them can be given all hypotyposis presentation subiectio sub adspectum a rendering in terms of sense is twofold either it is schematic as where the intuition corresponding to a concept comprehended by the understanding is given a priori or elsethen the capacity of the natural causes to serve this order of existence would not be missed on the contrary it would seem audacious and inconsiderate on our part even to ask for such a capacity or demand such an end from nature for nothing but the greatest incompatibility between human beings could have dispersed them into such inhospitable regions the distinctive character of things considered as natural endsa thing is possible only as an end where the causality to which it owes its origin must not be sought in the mechanism of nature but in a cause whose capacity of acting is determined by concepts what is required in order that we may perceive that a thing is only possible in this way is that its form is not possible on purely natural laws that is to say such laws as we may cognize by means of unaided understanding applied to objects of the senses but that on the contrary even to know it empirically in respect of its cause and effect presupposes concepts of reason here we have as far as any empirical laws of nature go a contingency of the form of the thing in relation to reason now reason in every case insists on cognizing the necessity of the form of a natural product even where it only desires to perceive the conditions involved in its production in the given form above mentioned however it cannot discover this necessity hence the contingency is itself a ground for making us look upon the origin of the thing as if just because of that contingency it could only be possible through reason but the causality so construed becomes the faculty of acting according to ends that is to say a will and the object which is represented as only deriving its possibility from such a will will be represented as possible only as an end suppose a person was in a country that seemed to be uninhabited and was to see a geometrical figure say a regular hexagon traced on the sand as he re ected and tried to form a concept of the figure his reason would make him conscious though perhaps obscurely that in the production of this concept there was unity of principle his reason would then forbid him to consider the sand the neighbouring sea the winds or even animals with their footprints as causes familiar to him or any other irrational cause as the ground of the possibility of such a form for the contingency of coincidence with a concept like this which is only possible in reason would appear to him so infinitely great that there might just as well be no law of nature at all in the case hence it would seem that the cause of the production of such an effect could not be contained in the mere mechanical operation of nature but that on the contrary a concept of such an object as a concept that only reason can give and compare the object with must likewise be what alone contains that causality on these grounds it would appear to him that this effect was one that might without reservation be regarded as an end though not as a natural end in other words he would regard it as a product of art vestigium hominis video but where a thing is recognized to be a product of naturesays all change has its cause universal law of nature transcendental judgement has nothing further to do than to furnish a priori the condition of subsumption under the concept of understanding placed before it this we get in the succession of the determinations of one and the same thing now for nature in general as an object of possible experience that law is cognized as absolutely necessary but besides this formal time condition the objects of empirical cognition are determined or so far as we can judge a priori are determinable in various ways so that specifically differentiated natures over and above what they have in common as things of nature in general are further capable of being causes in an infinite variety of ways and each of these modes must on the concept of a cause in general have its rule which is a law and consequently imports necessity although owing to the constitution and limitations of our faculties of cognition we may entirely fail to see this necessity accordingly in respect of nature s merely empirical laws we must think in nature a possibility of an endless multiplicity of empirical laws which yet are contingent so far as our insight goes ie cannot be cognized a priori in respect of these we judge the unity of nature according to empirical laws and the possibility of the unity of experience as a system according to empirical laws to be contingent but now such a unity is one which must be necessarily presupposed and assumed as otherwise we should not have a thoroughgoing connexion of empirical cognition in a whole of experience for the universal laws of nature while providing certainly for such a connexion among things generically as things of nature in general do not do so for them specifically as such particular things of nature hence judgement is compelled for its own guidance to adopt it as an a priori principle that what is for human insight contingent in the particular empirical laws of nature contains nevertheless unity of law in the synthesis of its manifold in an intrinsically possible experience unfathomable though still thinkable as such unity may no doubt be for us consequently as the unity of law in a synthesis which is cognized by us in obedience to a necessary aim a need of the understanding though recognized at the same time as contingent is represented as a purposiveness of objects here of nature so judgement which in respect of things under possible yet to be discovered empirical laws is merely re ective must regard nature in respect of the latter according to a principle of purposiveness for our cognitive faculty which then finds expression in the above maxims of judgement

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Summary as follows:

the fact that its hearing does not reach very far the disclosedness of dasein in wanting to have a conscience is thus constituted by the attunement of ang by understanding as projecting oneself upon one s ownm ost being guilty and by discourse as ret icence we shall call the eminent authentic disclosedness attested in dasein itself by its consciencethe reticent projecting oneself upon one ownmost being guilty which is ready for angst resoluteness resoluteness is an eminent mode of the disclosedness of da sein but in an earlier passage dis closedness was interpreted existential as this is not primarily a quality of udgment or of any articular mode of behavior at all but an essential constituent of being primordial truth in the world as such truth must be understood as a fundamental existential our ontological clarification of the statement that dasein is in the truth has pointed to the primordial disdosedness of this being as the truth of existence and for its delineation we have referred to the anal ysis of the authenticity of da sein now in resoluteness the most primordial truth of dasein has been reached because it is authentic the disclosedness of the there dis closes equiprimordially the whole of being in the world the world being in and the self that is this being as i am with the disclosedness of world innerworldly beings have always already been discovered the discoveredness of things at hand and objectively present is grounded in the discoveredness of the world for if the actual totality of relevance of things at hand is to be freed this requires a pre understanding of sig nificance in understanding significance da sein taking care of things is circumspectly referred to the things at hand encountered the understanding of significance as the disclosedness of the actual world is again grounded in the understanding of the for the sake of which to which dis covering of the totality of relevance goes back in seeking shelter sus tenance and livelihood we do so for the sake of the constant possibilities of dasein that are near to it upon these this being which is concerned about its being has always already projected itself thrown into its there dasein is always factically dependent on a definite world its world at the same time those nearest factical projects are guided by the lostness in the they taking care of things this lostness can be sum moned by one s own da seinif it funda mentally has the kind of being of being in only if with its dasein some thing like world is already discovered in terms of which beings can reveal themselves through touch and thus become accessible in their objective presence two beings which are objectively present within the world and are moreover worldless in themselves can never touch each other neither can be together with the other the supplement which are moreover worldless must not be left out because those beings which are not worldless for example dasein itself are objec tively present in the world too more precisely they can be understood within certain limits and with a certain justification as something merely objectively present to do this one must completely disregard or just not see the existential constitution of being in but with this possible understanding of dasein as something objectively present and only objectively present we may not attribute to dasein its own kind of objective presence this objective presence does not become accessible by disregarding the specific structures of da sein but only in a previous understanding of them dasein understands its ownmost being in the sense of a certain factual objective presence and yet the factuality of the fact of one s own dasein is ontologically totally different from the factual occurrence of a kind of stone the factuality of the fact da sein as the way in which every dasein actually is we call its facticity the complicated structure of this determination of being is itself compre hensible as a problem only in the light of the existential fundamental constitutions of dasein which we have already worked out the concept of facticity implies that an innetworldly being has being in the world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its destiny with the being of those beings which it encounters within its own world initiallybut i precisely toward them as the beings among which taking care of things lost in the they can linger in tranquillized familiarity entangled flight into the being at home of publicness is flight from not being at home that is from the uncanniness which lies in dasein as thrown as being in the world entrusted to itself in its being this uncanniness constantly pursues dasein and threatens its everyday lostness in the they although not explicitly this threat can factically go along with complete security and self sufficiency of the everyday way of taking care of things can arise in the most harmless situations nor does it have any need for darkness in which things usually become uncanny to us more easily in the dark there is emphatically nothing to see although the world is still there more ively if we interpret the uncanniness of dasein existentially and onto logically as a threat which concerns dasein itself and which comes from dasein itself we are not asserting that uncanniness has always already been understood in factical in this sense the everyday way in which dasein understands uncanniness is the entangled turning away which phases out not being at home the everydayness of this flee ing however shows phenomenally that a ngst as a fundamental kind of attunement belongs to the essential constitution of dasein of being in the world which as an existential one is never objctively present but is itself always in the mode of factical da sein that is in the mode of an attunement tranquillized familiar being in the world is a mode of the uncanniness of da sein not the other way around not being at home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phe nomenon and only because angst always already latently detennines being in the world can being in the world as being together with the world taking care of things and attuned be afraid fear is angst which has fallen prey to the world it is inauthentic and concealed from itself as such factically the mood of uncanniness remains for the most part existentielly uncomprehended moreover with thedominance of falling prey and publicness realhow are we to find that trace that can lead to revealing this phenomenon all ontological inquiries into phenomena such as guilt conscience and death must start from what everyday dasein says about them because its kind of being is entangled the way dasein gets interpreted is for the most part cally inauthenti oriented and does not get at the essence since the primor dially appropriate ontological kind of line questioning remains alien to it whenever we see something wrongly a directive as to the primordial idea of the phenomenon is also revealed but where do we get our criterion for the primordial existential meaning of guilty from the fact that this guilty turns up as a predicate of the i am does what is understood as guilt in inauthentic interpretation possibly lie in the being of dasein as such in such a way that it is also already guilty in that it actually factically exists thus by invoking the guilty which everyone agrees that he hears one has not yet answered the question of the existential meaning of what is called in the call this must first be defined if we are to make intelligible what the call of guilty means and why and how it gets dis torted in its significance by everyday interpretation everyday common sense initially takes being guilty in the sense of owing something having something on account one is supposed to return something to the other which is due to him bis being guilty as having debts is a way of being with with others in the field of taking care of things as in providing something or bringing it along further modes of taking care of things are depriving borrowing withholding taking robbing that is in some way not doing justice to the claims that the others have made as to their possessions this kind of being guilty is related to things that can be taken care of then being guilty has the further significance of for being responsible that is being the cause or author of something or being the occa sion for something in the sense of this being responsible for some thing one can be guilty without owing anything to someone else or corning to owe him conversely one can owe something to another without being responsible for it oneself another person can incur debts to others for me these vulgar significations of being guilty as having debts with and being responsible for can go together and determine a kind of behavior which we call making oneself responsible that is by having the responsibility for having a debt one may break a law and make oneself punishable however the requirement that one fails to sat isfy need not necessarily be related to possessions it can regulate public being with one another in general this definite making oneself respon sible by breaking a law can also at the same time have the character of becoming responsible to others that does not occur by breaking a law as such but through my having the responsibility for the other s becoming jeopardized in his existence led astray or even destroyed this becoming responsible to others is possible without breaking the public lawworld can mean the public world of the we or one s own and nearest in the home surrounding world finally world designates the ontological and existential concept of worldliness worldliness itself can be modified into the respective structural totality of particular worlds and contains the a priori of worldliness in general we shall reserve the expression world as a tenn for the meaning established in if we use it at times in the first meaning we shall put it in quotation marks thus tenninologically worldly means a kind of being of da sein never a kind of being of something objectively present in the world we shall call the latter something belonging to the world or inner worldly one look at traditional ontology shows us that one skips over the phenomenon of worldliness when one fails to see the constitution of dasein of being in the world instead one tries to interpret the world in tenns of the being of the being which is objectively present within the world but has not however even been initially discovered in terms of nature tontologically and categorially understood nature is a boundary case of the being of possible innerworldly beings dasein can discover beings as nature only in a definite mode of its being in the world this kind of knowledge has the character of a certain de worlding of the world as the categorial content of structures of being of a definite being encountered in the world nature can never render worldliness intelligible butbut if as we suggest we thus find phenomenally that being in the world knowing is a kind of being of one might object that with such an interpretation of knowing the problem of knowledge is annihilated what is there left to ask about if one presupposes that knowing is already together with its world which it is after all flt st supposed to reach in the transcending of the subject apart from the fact that in the question just formulated the standpoint which is again not demonstrated phenomenally but is rather constructivist makes its appearance what criterion then decides whether and in which sense there is to be a problem of knowledge other than that of the phenomenon of knowing itself and the kind of being of the knower if we now ask what shows itself in the phenomenal findings of knowing we must remember that knowing itself is grounded before hand in already being in the world which essentially constitutes the being of da sein initially this already being with is not solely a rigid staring at something merely objectively present being in the world as taking care of things is taken in by the world which it takes care of in order for knowing to be possible as determining by observation what is objec tively present there must first be a deficiency of having to do with the world and taking care of it in refraining from all production manipu lation and so on taking care of things places itself in the only mode of being in which is left over in the mode of simply lingering with the basis of this beings within the world solely in their mere and as on kind of being toward the world which lets us encounter outward appearance eidos a mode of this kind of being looking explicitly at something thus encountered is possible this looking at is always a way of assuming a definite direction toward something a glimpse of what is objec tively present it takes over a perspective from the beings thus encoun tered from the very beginning

Total number of Sentences = 2633
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Summary as follows:

the psychological epistemological approach was not every question inspired by hume first and quite correctly to be taken as a psychological question if rational science becomes a problem if the claim of the purely a priori sciences to have unconditional objective validity and thus to be the possible and necessary method for rational sciences of fact becomes a problem it should first be taken into consideration as we emphasized above that science in general is a human accomplishment an accomplishment of human beings who find themselves in the world the world of general experience and that it is one among other types of practical accomplishments which is aimed at spiritual structures of a certain sort called theoretical like all praxis this one is related in a sense which is its own and of which the practitioner of it is conscious to the pregiven world of experience and at the same time takes its ordered place within this world thus enigmas about how a spiritual accomplishment comes to pass can be clarified one will say only through psychological demonstrations and they remain thus within the pregiven world if kant on the other hand in the questions he posed and in his regressive method also naturally makes use of the pregiven world but at the same time constructs a transcendental subjectivity through whose concealed transcendental functions with unswerving necessity the world of experience is formed he runs into the difficulty that a particular quality of the human soul which itself belongs to the world and is thus presupposed with it is supposed to accomplish and to have already accomplished a formative process which shapes this whole world but as soon as we distinguish this transcendental subjectivity from the soul we get involved in something incomprehensibly mythical the possibility of a hidden truth in kanvs transcendental philosophy the problem of a new dimension the antagonism between the life of the plane and the life of depth nevertheless to contain some truth a truth to be made actually accessible to insight which is indeed the case it would be possible only through the fact that the transcendental functions which are supposed to explain the above mentioned enigmas concerning objectively valid knowledge belong to a dimension of the living spirit that had to remain hidden because of very natural inhibitions from humanity and even from the scientists of the ages whereas this a dimension can be made accessible to scientific understanding through a method of disclosure appropriate to it as a realm of experiential and theoretical self evidence the fact that this dimension remained hidden through the ages the fact that even after it made itself felt it never aroused a habitual and consistent theoretical interestthis is the discovery of absolute intersubjectivity objectified in the world as the whole of mankind as that in which reason in obscurity in elucidation in the movement of lucid self understanding is in infinite progress the discovery of the necessary concrete manner of being of absolute in the ultimate sense transcendental subjectivity in a transcendental life of constant world constitution the new discovery correlative to this of the existing world whose ontic meaning as transcendentally constituted results in a new meaning for what in the earlier stages was called world worldtruth world knowledge but within this a new meaning is also given to human existence man s existence in the spatiotemporally pregiven world as the self objectification of transcendental subjectivity and its being its constituting life what follows this is the ultimate self understanding of man as being responsible for his own human being his self understanding as being in being called to a life of apodicticity not only in abstractly practicing apodictic science in the usual sense but as being mankind which realizes its whole concrete being in apodictic freedom by becoming apodictic mankind in the whole active life of its reason through which it is human as i said mankind understanding philosophy as mankinds self reflection itself as rational understanding that it is rational in seeking to be rational that this signifies an infinity of living and striving toward reason that reason is precisely that which man qua man in his innermost being is aiming for that which alone can satisfy him make him blessed that reason allows for no differentiation into theoretical practical aesthetic or whatever that being human is teleological being and an ought to be and that this teleology holds sway in each and every activity and project of an ego that through self understanding in all this it can know the apodictic telos and that this knowing the ultimate self understanding has no other form than self understanding according to a priori principles as self understanding in the form of philosophy appendix v objectivity and the world of experiencei experiential life we stand within the heraclitean flux of the changing data of sensible things and throughout the alteration of these data we do have with naive experiential self evidence the certainty of coming to know through seeing touching feeling hearing etc the same thing through its properties and of confirming it through repetition of the experiences as something which objectively and actually is and is such and such yet clearly what we gain hereby as knowledge of the thing is in all its identifiable determinations something that remains unwaveringly approximate suspended in vague differentiations of greater or less perfection what becomes well known through repeated experience is always still only relatively known in regard to everything known about itit is a philosophy which in opposition to prescientific and scientific objectivism goes back to knowing subjectivity as the primal locus of all objective formations of sense and ontic validities undertakes to understand the existing world as a structure of sense and validity and in this way seeks to set in motion an essentially new type of scientific attitude and a new type of philosophy in fact if we do not count the negativistic skeptical philosophy of a hume the kantian system is the first attempt and one carried out with impressive scientific seriousness at a truly universal transcendental philosophy meant to be a rigorous science in a sense of scientific rigor which has only now been discovered and which is the only genuine sense something similar holds we can say in advance for the great continuations and revisions of kantian transcendentalism in the great systems of german idealism they all share the basic conviction that the objective sciences no matter how much they and particularly the exact sciences may consider themselves in virtue of their obvious theoretical and practical accomplishments to be in possession of the only true method and to be treasure houses of ultimate truths are not seriously sciences at all not cognitions ultimately grounded e not ultimately theoretically responsible for themselves and that they are not then cognitions of what exists in ultimate truth this can be accomplished according to german idealism only by a transcendental subjective method and carried through as a system transcendental philosophy as was already the case with kant the opinion is not that the self evidence of the positive scientific method is an illusion and its accomplishment an illusory accomplishment but ratherthat this self evidence is itself a problem that the objective scientific method rests upon a never questioned deeply concealed subjective ground whose philosophical elucidation will for the first time reveal the true meaning of the accomplishments of positive science and correctively the true ontic meaning of the objective world precisely as a transcendental subjective meaning now in order to be able to understand the position of kant and of the systems of transcendental idealism proceeding from him within modern philosophy s teleological unity of meaning and thus to make progress in our own self understanding it is necessary to critically get closer to the style of kant s scientific attitude and to clarify the lack of radicalism we are attacking in his philosophizing it is with good reason that we pause over kant a significant turning point in modern history the critique to be directed against him will reflect back and elucidate all earlier philosophical history namely in respect to the general meaning of scientific discipline which all earlier philosophies strove to realize as the only meaning which lay and could possibly lie within their spiritual horizon precisely in this way a more profound concept the most important of all of objectivism will come to the fore more important than the one we were able to define earlier and with itevery sort of communication naturally presupposes the commonality of the surrounding world which is established as soon as we are persons for one another at all though this can be completely empty inactive but it is something else to have them as fellows in communal life to talk with them to share their concerns and strivings to be bound to them in friendship and enmity love and hate it is only here that we enter the sphere of the social historical world when we live in the natural the nontranscendental attitude different thematic directions and thus different directions of theoretical interest open themselves to us in accord with the structure of the pregiven world the latter being given to us as our communal surrounding world and through this as objective world through this means that the surrounding world is something changeable that we progress in life from one surrounding world to another whereas throughout this alteration the same world is yet continuously experienced the surrounding world becoming a manner of appearance of this world in the attitude oriented toward essences we can beginning with the factual common world investigate the essential form of a human surrounding world and investigate the essential form of a surrounding world which in the alteration of surrounding worlds through penetration into alien human civilizations is ever constituting itself anew and assuming the possibility that this process could go on infinitely we can sketch out the structure of an existing world as world of possible experience e as emerging through an ongoing process of correction throughout possible transitional surrounding worldsno growth of exactness or of the methods of measurement today when we speak of measuring of units of measure methods of measure or simply of magnitudes we mean as a rule those that are already related to idealities and are exact so it is difficult for us to carry out the abstract isolation of the plena which is so necessary here e to consider experimentally so to speak the world of bodies exclusively according to the aspect of those properties belonging under the title specific sense qualities through a universal abstraction opposed to the one which gives rise to the universal world of shapes what constitutes exactness obviously nothing other than what we exposed above empirical measuring with increasing precision but under the guidance of a world of idealities or rather a world of certain particular ideal structures that can be correlated with given scales of measurement such a world having been objectified in advance through idealization and construction and now we can make the contrast clear in a word we have not two but only one universal form of the world not two but only one geometry e one of shapes without having a second for plena the bodies of the empirical intuitable world are such in accord with the world structure belonging to this world a priori that each body has abstractly speaking an extension of its own and that all these extensions are yet shapes of the one total infinite extension of the world as world as the universal configuration of all bodies it thus has a total form encompassing all forms and this form is idealizable in the way analyzed and can be mastered through construction to be sure it is also part of the world structure that all bodies have their specific sense qualities but the qualitative configurations based purely on these are not analogues of spatiotemporal shapes are not incorporated into a world form peculiar to them

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a certain tactile experience felt in the upper armsignifies a certain tactile experience in the forearm and shoulder along with a certain visual aspect of the same arm not because the various tactile perceptions among themselves or the tactile and visual ones are all involved in one intelligible arm as the different facets of a cube are related to the idea of a cube but because the arm seen and the arm touched like the different segments of the arm together perform one and the same action just as we saw earlier that motor habit threw light on the particular nature of bodily space so here habit in general enables us to understand the general synthesis of one s own body and just as the analysis of bodily spatiality foreshadowed that of the unity of one s own body so we may extend to all habits what we have said about motor ones in fact every habit is both motor and perceptual because it lies as we have said between explicit perception and actual movement in the basic function which sets boundaries to our field of vision and our field of action learning to find one s way among things with a stick which we gave a little earlier as an example of motor habit is equally an example of perceptual habit once the stick has become a familiar instrument the world of feelable things recedes and now begins not at the outer skin of the hand but at the end of the stick one is tempted to say that through the sensations produced by the pressure of the stick on the hand the blind man builds up the stick along with its various positions and that the latter then mediate a second order object the external thing it would appear in this case that perception is always a reading off from the same sensory data but constantly accelerated and operating with ever more attenuated signals but habit does not consist in interpreting the pressures of the stick on the hand as indications of certain positions of the stick and these as signs of an external object since it relieves us of the necessity of doing so the pressures on the hand and the stick are no longer given the stick is no longer an object perceived by the blind man but an instrument with which he perceives it is a bodily auxiliary an extension of the bodily synthesis correspondingly the external object is not the geometrized projection or invariant of a set of perspectives but something towards which the stick leads us and the perspectives of which according to perceptual evidence are not signs but aspects intellectualism cannot conceive any passage from the perspective to the thing itself or from sign to significance otherwise than as an interpretation an apperception a cognitive intention according to this view sensory data and perspectives are at each level contents grasped as aufgefasst als manifestations of one and the same intelligible core but this analysis distorts both the sign and the meaning it separates out by a process of objectification of both the sensecontent which is already pregnant with a meaning and the invariant core which is not a law but a thing it conceals the organic relationship between subject and world the active transcendence of consciousness the momentum which carries it into a thing and into a world by means of its organs and instruments the analysis of motor habit as an extension of existence leads on then to an analysis of perceptual habit as the coming into possession of a world conversely every perceptual habit husserl for example for a long time defined consciousness or the imposition of a significance in terms of the auffassung inhalt framework and as a beseelende auffassung he takes a decisive step forward in recognizing from the time of his lectures on time that this operation presupposes another deeper one whereby the content is itself made ready for this apprehensionhow conversely an intention a thought or a project can detach themselves from the personal subject and become visible outside him in the shape of his body and in the environment which he builds for himself the constitution of the other person does not fully elucidate that of society which is not an existence involving two or even three people but co existence involving an indefinite number of consciousness yet the analysis of the perception of others runs up against a difficulty in principle raised by the cultural world since it is called upon to solve the paradox of a consciousness seen from the outside of a thought which has its abode in the external world and which therefore is already subjectless and anonymous compared with mine what we have said about the body provides the beginning of a solution to this problem the existence of other people is a difficulty and an outrage for objective thought if the events of the world are in lachelier s words a network of general properties standing at the point of intersection of functional relations which in principle enable the analysis of the former to be carried through and if the body is indeed a province of the world if it is that object which the biologist talks about that conjunction of processes analysed in physiological logical treatises that collection of organs shown in the plates of books on anatomy then my experience can be nothing but the dialogue between bare consciousness and the system of objective correlations which it conceives the body of another like my own is not inhabited but is an object standing before the consciousness which thinks about or constitutes it other men and myself seen as empirical beings are merely pieces of mechanism worked by springs but the true subject is irrepeatable for that consciousness which is hidden in so much esh and blood is the least intelligible of occult qualities my consciousness being co extensive with what can exist for me and corresponding to the whole system of experience cannot encounter in that system another consciousness capable of bringing immediately to light in the world the background unknown to me of its own phenomena there are two modes of being and two only being in itself which is that of objects arrayed in space and being for itself which is that of consciousness now another person would seem to stand before me as an in itself and yet to exist for himself thus requiring of me in order to be perceived a contradictory operation since i ought both to distinguish him from myself and therefore place him in the world of objects and think of him as a consciousness that is the sort of being with no outside and no parts to which i have access merely because that being is myself and because the thinker and the thought about are amalgamated in him there is thus no place for other people and a plurality of consciousnesses in objective thought in so far as i constitute the world i cannot conceive another consciousness for it too would have to constitute the world and at least as regards this other view of the worldthe general discussion of the association of ideas pp a patient named schneider says he needs anhaltspunkte geometrical outline in which each stimulus occupies an explicit position and schneider s disease lies precisely in his need in order to find out where he is being touched to convert the bodily area touched into a shape but each stimulus applied to the body of the normal person arouses a kind of potential movement rather than an actual one the part of the body in question sheds its anonymity is revealed by the presence of a particular tension as a certain power of action within the framework of the anatomical apparatus in the case of the normal subject the body is available not only in real situations into which it is drawn it can turn aside from the world apply its activity to stimuli which affect its sensory surfaces lend itself to experimentation and generally speaking take its place in the realm of the potential it is because of its confinement within the actual that an unsound sense of touch calls for special movements designed to localize stimuli and for the same reason the patient substitutes for tactile recognition and perception a laborious decoding of stimuli and deduction of objects for a key for instance to appear as such in my tactile experience a kind of fulness of touch is required a tactile field in which local impressions may be co ordinated into a shape just as notes are mere stepping stones in a melody and that very viscosity of tactile data which makes the body dependent upon actual situations reduces the object to a collection of successive characteristics perception to an abstract account recognition to a rational synthesis or a plausible conjecture and strips the object of its carnal presence and facticity whereas in the normal person every event related to movement or sense of touch causes consciousness to put up a host of intentions which run from the body as the centre of potential action either towards the body itself or towards the object in the case of the patient on the other hand the tactile impression remains opaque and sealed up it may well draw the grasping hand towards itself but does not stand in front of the hand in the manner of a thing which can be pointed out the normal person reckons with the possible which thus without shifting from its position as a possibility acquires a sort of actuality in the patient s case however the field of actuality is limited to what is met with in the shape of a real contact or is related to these data by some explicit process of deduction the analysis of abstract movement in patients throws into relief this possession of space this spatial existence which is the primary condition of all living perception if the patient is ordered to shut his eyes and then perform an abstract movement a set of preparatory operations is called for in order to enable him to find the operative limb the direction or pace of the movement and finally the plane in which it is to be executed if for instance he is ordered to move his arm with no detailin the literal sense an appearance only when it is indeterminate the question how there come to be true shapes or sizes or objective or real ones amounts to asking how there are for us determinate shapes and there are determinate shapes like a square or a diamond shape or any actual spatial configuration because our body as a point of view upon things and things as abstract elements of one single world form a system in which each moment is immediately expressive of every other a certain way of directing my gaze in relation to the object signifies a certain appearance of the object and of neighbouring objects in all its appearances the object retains invariable characteristics remains itself invariable and is an object because all the possible values in relation to size and shape which it can assume are bound up in advance in the formula of its relations with the context what we are affirming in the specific being of the object is in reality a facies totius universi which remains unchanged and in it is grounded the equivalence of all its appearances and the identity of its being in following out the logic of objective size and shape we should with kant see that it refers to the positing of a world as a rigorously interrelated system that we are never enclosed within appearance and that in short the object alone is able fully to appear thus we place ourselves directly within the object we overlook the psychologist s problems but have we really left them behind when it is said that the true size or shape are no more than the constant law according to which the appearance the distance and the orientation vary it is assumed that they can be treated as variables or measurable sizes and therefore that they are already determinate when what we are concerned with is precisely how they become so kant is right in saying that perception is by its nature polarized towards the object but what is incomprehensible in his account is appearance as appearance since the perspective views of the object are directly and immediately set into the objective system of the world the subject thinks rather than perceives his perception and its truth perceptual consciousness does not give us perception as a body of organized knowledge or the size and shape of the object as laws the numerical specifications of science retrace the outline of a constitution of the world which is already realized before shape and size come into being like the scientist kant takes the results of this pre scientific experience for granted and is enabled to ignore them only because he makes use of them when i contemplate before me the furniture in my roomthe body are not only the routes instruments or manifestations of personal existence the latter takes up and absorbs into itself their existence as it is anonymously given when we say that the life of the body or the esh and the life of the psyche are involved in a relationship of reciprocal expression or that the bodily event always has a psychic meaning these formulations need to be explained valid as they are for excluding causal thought they do not mean that the body is the transparent integument of spirit the return to existence as to the setting in which the communication between body and mind can be understood is not a return to consciousness or spirit and existential psychoanalysis must not serve as a pretext for a revival of mentalistic philosophy spiritualisme this will be better understood if we clarify the notions of expression and meaning which belong to the world of language and thought as already constituted which we have just applied uncritically to the body mind relationship and which bodily experience must in fact lead us to correct a girl whose mother has forbidden her to see again the young man with whom she is in love cannot sleep loses her appetite and finally the use of speech an initial manifestation of this loss of speech is found to have occurred during her childhood after an earthquake and la structure du comportement pp rinswanger ber psychotherapie pp subsequently again following a severe fright a strictly freudian interpretation of this would introduce a reference to the oral phase of sexual development but what is fixated on the mouth is not merely sexual existence but more generally those relations with others having the spoken word as their vehicle in so far as the emotion elects to find its expression in loss of speech this is because of all bodily functions speech is the most intimately linked with communal existence or as we shall put it with co existence loss of speech then stands for the refusal of co existence just as in other subjects a fit of hysterics is the means of escaping from the situation the patient breaks with relational life within the family circle more generally she tends to break with life itself her inability to swallow food arises from the fact that swallowing symbolizes the movement of existence which carries events and assimilates them the patient is unable literally to swallow the prohibition which has been imposed upon her in the subject s childhood fear was translated by loss of speech because the imminence of death violently interrupted co existence and threw her back upon her own personal fate the symptom of aphonia reappears because the mother s prohibition restores the situation metaphorically and because moreover by shutting off the future from the subject it leads her back to her favourite forms of behaviour these motivations may be supposed to take advantage of a particular sensitivity of the throat and the mouth in the case of our subject a sensitivity which may be related to the history of her libido and to the oral phase of sexuality thus though the sexual significance of symptoms can be discerned in faint outline their more general significance in relation to past and future to the self and others that is to say to the fundamental dimensions of existenceif we were consciousness we would have to have before us the world our history and perceived objects in their uniqueness as systems of transparent relationships now even when we are not dealing with psychology when we try to comprehend in direct re ection and without the help of the varied associations of inductive thought what a perceived movement or a circle are we can elucidate this singular fact only by varying it somewhat through the agency of imagination and then fastening our thought upon the invariable element of this mental experience we can get through to the individual only by the hybrid procedure of finding an example that is by stripping it of its facticity thus it is questionable whether thought can ever quite cease to be inductive and whether it can assimilate any experience to the point of taking up and appropriating its whole texture a philosophy becomes transcendental or radical not by taking its place in absolute consciousness without mentioning the ways by which this is reached but by considering itself as a problem not by postulating a knowledge rendered totally explicit but by recognizing as the fundamental philosophic problem this presumption on reason s part that is why we had to begin our examination of perception with psychological considerations if we had not done so we would not have understood the whole meaning of the transcendental problem since we would not starting from the natural attitude have methodically followed the procedures which lead to it we had to frequent the phenomenal field and become acquainted through psychological descriptions with the subject of phenomena if we were to avoid placing ourselves from the start as does re exive philosophy in a transcendental dimension assumed to be eternally given thus by passing the full problem of constitution we could not begin however our psychological description without suggesting that once purged of all psychologism it can become a philosophical method in order to revive perceptual experience buried under its own results it would not have been enough to present descriptions of them which might possibly not have been understood we had to establish by philosophical references and anticipations the point of view from which they might appear true thus we could begin neither without psychology nor with psychology alone experience anticipates a philosophy and philosophy is merely an elucidated experience but now that the phenomenal field has been sufficiently circumscribed let us enter this ambiguousdomain and let us make sure of our first steps as far as the psychologist is concerned until the psychologist s self scrutiny leads us by way of a second order re ection to the phenomenon of the phenomenon and decisively transforms the phenomenal field into a transcendental one the problem of the bodyour perception ends in objects and the object once constituted appears as the reason for all the experiences of it which we have had or could have for example

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take a piece of string with points and if the last part is pulled the first part will be moved in exactly the same way as it would be moved if one of the intermediate points or were pulled while the final point remained immobile by the same token when i feel a pain in the foot physics teaches me that this sensation is produced by means of the nerves dispersed through the foot which since they extend upwards like strings as far as the brain when plucked in the foot also pluck the inmost parts of the brain in which they terminate thus stimulating a particular motion in these parts of the brain which is so ordained by nature that it affects the mind with a feeling of pain apparently located in the foot but because these nerves have to pass up the leg the thigh the loins the back and the neck in order to connect the foot and the brain it can come about that even if the part of the nerve that is in the foot is not affected but only one of the intermediate parts exactly the same movement will take place in the brain as takes place when the foot is injured so that the mind will necessarily experience the same pain and the same must apply to all our other sensations finally i observe that since each one of the motions that take place in the part of the brain that directly affects the mind produces only one sensation in the mind no better explanation of this can be conceived than that the particular movement produces of all the possible sensations it could produce the sensation that most effectively and most frequently conduces to the preservation of the human being in good health and experience bears witness that this applies to all the sensations with which nature has endowed us and that therefore nothing at all can be found in them that does not bear witness to god s immense power and goodness thus for instance when the nerves in the foot are violently and unusually stimulated their movement transmitted through the spinal cord to the inner parts of the brain there gives a signal to the mind to experience a certain sensation namely a pain experienced as being in the foot by this the mind is stimulated to do its best to remove the cause of the pain as being damaging to the foot to be sure the nature of man could have been so established by god that this same motion in the brain could have represented something different to the mind it could have represented itself in so far as it takes place in the brain or in so far as it takes place in the foot or in any of the places in between

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some maintain that mediate knowledge must be included in the knowledge of mere intelligence but the principal objection is aimed at the foundation of this knowledge for what foundation can god have for seeing what the people of keilah would do a simple contingent and free act has nothing in itself to yield a principle of certainty unless one look upon it as predetermined by the decrees of god and by the causes that are dependent upon them consequently the difficulty existing in actual free actions will exist also in conditional free actions that is to say god will know them only under the condition of their causes and of his decrees which are the first causes of things and it will not be possible to separate such actions from those causes so as to know a contingent event in a way that is independent of the knowledge of its causes therefore all must of necessity be traced back to the predetermination of god s decrees and this mediate knowledge so it will be said will offer no remedy the theologians who profess to be adherents of st augustine claim also that the system of the molinists would discover the source of god s grace in the good qualities of man and this they deem an infringement of god s honour and contrary to st paul s teaching it would be long and wearisome to enter here into the replies and rejoinders coming from one side and the other and it will suffice for me to explain how i conceive that there is truth on both sides for this result i resort to my principle of an infinitude of possible worlds represented in the region of eternal verities that is in the object of the divine intelligence where all conditional futurities must be comprised for the case of the siege of keilahinnumerable passages are quoted for and against this opinion as father annat has himself shown in the work that has just been mentioned de incoacta libertate so easy is it to render this subject obscure as bayle says at the conclusion of this discourse as for father gibieuf it must be admitted that he often alters the meaning of his terms and that consequently he does not answer the question in the main albeit he often writes with good sense indeed confusion springs more often than not from ambiguity in terms and from one s failure to take trouble over gaining clear ideas about them that gives rise to these eternal and usually mistaken contentions on necessity and contingency on the possible and the impossible but provided that it is understood that necessity and possibility taken metaphysically and strictly depend solely upon this question whether the object in itself or that which is opposed to it implies contradiction or not and that one takes into account that contingency is consistent with the inclinations or reasons which contribute towards causing determination by the will provided also that one knows how to distinguish clearly between necessity and determination or certainty between metaphysical necessity which admits of no choice presenting only one single object as possible and moral necessity which constrains the wisest to choose the best finally provided that one is rid of the chimera of complete indifference which can only be found in the books of philosophers and on paper for they cannot even conceive the notion in their heads or prove its reality by an example in things one will easily escape from a labyrinth whose unhappy daedalus was the human mind that labyrinth has caused infinite confusion as much with the ancients as with those of later times even so far as to lead men into the absurd error of the lazy sophism which closely resembles fate after the turkish fashion i do not wonder if in reality the thomists and the jesuits and even the molinists and the jansenists agree together on this matter more than is supposed a thomist and even a wise jansenist will content himself with certain determination without going on to necessity and if someone goes so far the error mayhap will lie only in the word a wise molinist will be content with an indifference opposed to necessity but such as shall not exclude prevalent inclinationswill nevertheless it implies no contradiction that god should will directly or permissively a thing not implying contradiction and in this sense it is permitted to say that god can will it in a word when one speaks of the possibility of a thing it is not a question of the causes that can bring about or prevent its actual existence otherwise one would change the nature of the terms and render useless the distinction between the possible and the actual this abelard did and wyclif appears to have done after him in consequence of which they fell needlessly into unsuitable and disagreeable expressions that is why when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary and brings in the consideration of what god wills or chooses one alters the issue for god chooses among the possibles and for that very reason he chooses freely and is not compelled there would be neither choice nor freedom if there were but one course possible one must also answer bayle s syllogisms so as to neglect none of the objections of a man so gifted they occur in chapter of his reply to the questions of a provincial vol god can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he has for his wisdom now the salvation of all menwhether that be done through a grace efficacious of itself that is to say through a divine inward motion which wholly determines our will to the good that it does or whether there be only a sufficient grace but such as does not fail to attain its end and to become efficacious in the inward and outward circumstances wherein the man is and has been placed by god one must return to the same conclusion that god is the final reason of salvation of grace of faith and of election in jesus christ and be the election the cause or the result of god s design to give faith it still remains true that he gives faith or salvation to whom he pleases without any discernible reason for his choice which falls upon but few men so it is a terrible judgement that god giving his only son for the whole human race and being the sole author and master of the salvation of men yet saves so few of them and abandons all others to the devil his enemy who torments them eternally and makes them curse their creator though they have all been created to diffuse and show forth his goodness his justice and his other perfections and this outcome inspires all the more horror as the sole cause why all these men are wretched to all eternity is god s having exposed their parents to a temptation that he knew they would not resist as this sin is inherent and imputed to men before their will has participated in it as this hereditary vice impels their will to commit actual sins and as countless men in childhood or maturity that have never heard or have not heard enough of jesus christ saviour of the human race die before receiving the necessary succour for their withdrawal from this abyss of sin these men too are condemned to be for ever rebellious against god and plunged in the most horrible miseries with the wickedest of all creatures though in essence they have not been more wicked than others and several among them have perchance been less guilty than some of that little number of elect who were saved by a grace without reason and who thereby enjoy an eternal felicity which they had not deserved such in briefthey imagine despotism in god and demand that man be convinced without reason of the absolute certainty of his election a course that is liable to have dangerous consequences but all those who acknowledge that god produces the best plan having chosen it from among all possible ideas of the universe that he there finds man inclined by the original imperfection of creatures to misuse his free will and to plunge into misery that god prevents the sin and the misery in so far as the perfection of the universe which is an emanation from his may permit it those i say show forth more clearly that god s intention is the one most right and holy in the world that the creature alone is guilty that his original limitation or imperfection is the source of his wickedness that his evil will is the sole cause of his misery that one cannot be destined to salvation without also being destined to the holiness of the children of god and that all hope of election one can have can only be founded upon the good will infused into one s heart by the grace of god metaphysical considerations also are brought up against my explanation of the moral cause of moral evil

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what can be concluded from this supposition it will undoubtedly be concluded that god does not deceive us that he has not given us eyes like glasses that magnify and diminish objects and that we must therefore agree that our eyes represent things to us as they are it is true that god never deceives us but we often deceive ourselves by judging things too hastily for we often judge that the objects of which we have ideas exist and even that they are altogether like these ideas but it often turns out that these objects are not at all like our ideas and even that they do not exist from the fact that we have an idea of a thing it does not follow that the thing exists and still less that it is entirely like our idea of it from the fact that god provides us with a given sensible idea of size as when a fathom ruler is before our eyes it does not follow that the ruler has only that extension represented to us by the idea for in the first place not all men have precisely the same sensible idea of the ruler since not all men s eyes are disposed in the same way second a given person sometimes does not have the same sensible idea of a fathom ruler when he views it with the right eye and then the left as has already been said finally it often happens that the same person has different ideas of the same objects at different times according to whether he believes them to be more or less at a distance as we shall explain elsewhere thus it is a groundless prejudice to believe that we see objects as they are in themselves for our eyes which were given us only for the preservation of our body perform their duty quite well by providing us with ideas of objects proportioned to the idea we have of the size of our body although there are in these objects an infinite number of parts that they do not disclose to us but to understand better what we should judge concerning the extension of bodies on the basis of the testimony of our eyesmy own view is that such is not the case especially since all this could be done in another much simpler and easier way as we shall sec shortly for as god always acts in the simplest ways it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know objects by assuming the creation of an infinity of beings since the difficulty can be resolved in an easier and more straightforward fashion but even if the mind had a store of all the ideas necessary for it to perceive objects yet it would be impossible to explain how the soul could choose them to represent them to itself how for example the soul could make itself instantly perceive all the different objects whose size figure distance and motion it discovers when it opens its eyes in the countryside through this means it could not even perceive a single object such as the sun when it is before the body s eyes for since the image the sun imprints in the brain does not resemble the idea we have of it as we have proved elsewhere and as the soul does not perceive the motion the sun produces in the brain and in the fundus of the eyes it is inconceivable that it should be able to determine precisely which among the infinite number of its ideas it would have to represent to itself in order to imagine or see the sun and to see it as having a given size it cannot be said then that ideas of things are created with us or that this suffices for us to sec the objects surrounding us nor can it be said that god constantly produces as many new ideas as there are different things we perceive this view is refuted well enough by what has just been said in this chapter furthermore we must at all times actually have in us the ideas of all things since we can at all times will to think about anythingwhich we could not do unless we had already perceived them confusedly e unless an infinite number of ideas were present to the mind for after all one cannot will to think about objects of which one has no ideathey must be picked up and held against each other for a comparison and even then we often hesitate being sure of nothing this can be clearly seen in examining the size of coins that are almost equal here we must place them on top of each other to see with assurance whether they correspond in size if a line is drawn on paper and another is drawn at its end perpendicular and equal to it they will appear roughly equal but if the perpendicular is drawn at its middle the perpendicular will appear perceptibly longer and the closer to the middleit is drawn the longerthe same experiment can be performed with two straws so that to know if they are equal or which is longer they must be laid one upon the other as is ordinarily done our eyes therefore deceive us not only with regard to the size of bodies in themselves but also with regard to the relation bodies have among themselves note those who are ignorant of the eye s structure and the principles of its construction would do well to read the appendix found at the end of this work before reading this chapter the errors of our eyes concerning figures we have no knowledge of the smallest ones explanation of certain natura judgments by which we avoid error that even these judgments mislead us in certain instances the errors of sight concerning figures our sight is less liable to mislead us when representing figures us than when representing anything else because figure in itself is nothing absolute and because its nature consists in the relation between the limits of some space and a given straight line or a point conceived of as in that space which might be termed as in the case of a circle the center ofthat figure nevertheless we are mistaken in a thousand ways about figures and we never know any of them with complete precision through the senses that we have no lcnowledge of the smallest figures we have just proved that our sight does not reveal us evecy sort of extension but only that which has some significant relation our body and that for this reason we do not see each part of the smallest animals nor those parts that make up both solid and liquid bodies thus unable perceive these parts on account of their size we consequently cannot perceive their figures since the figure of a body is but its limiting boundacy here we already have an almost infinite number of figures the greatest part of which remain unnoticed by our eyes which even lead the mind relying too much on their capacity and not investigating things carefully enough believe that these figures do not exist we can approximate the figures of bodies proportioned our vision which are quite few in comparison with all the rest but their figures cannot be known exactly through the senses through sight we cannot even ascertain whether a circle and a square the simplest of figures are not in fact an ellipse and a parallelogram although these figures might be in our hands and vecy close our eyes funhennore we cannot determine exactly whether a line is straight or not especially if it is of some length for that a ruler is required butit follows that everyone who sees the stars in the heavens and who then voluntarily judges they are there performs two false judgments one of which is natural the other free one is a judgment of the senses or a compound sensation which is within us occurs independently of us and even in spite of us and according to which no judgment should be made the other is a free judgment of the will which can be avoided and which consequently we must not make if we wish to avoid error the reason for these false judgments but here is why these same stars that are immediately seen are thought be extemalio the soul and in the heavens the reason is that it is not in the soul s power to see them at will for it can perceive them only when the motion to which the ideas of these objects are joined by nature occurs in the brain now because the soul is not aware of motion in the sense organs but only of its own sensations and because it knows that these sensations are not produced within it by itself the soul is led to judge that they are external to it and in the cause that represents them to it it has made these kinds of judgments so many times simultaneously with its perception of objects that it can hardly avoid making them to explain fully what i have just said it would be necessary to show the uselessness of that infinite number of insignificant beings termed species and ideas which are as nothing and which yet represent all things which we create and destroy at will and which our ignorance has led us imagine in order make sense of things we do not understand it would be necessary to demonstrate the soundness of the opinion of those who believe that god is the true father of the light that alone enlightens all men and without which the simplest of truths would not be intelligible and without which the sun as bright as it is would not even be visible for this opinion has led me to the discovery of the following seemingly paradoxical truth ideas that represent creaturesusconsists only in perfect virtue e in knowledge and love of god and in a delicate pleasure that always attends them let us keep in mind then a that external objects contain nothing either enjoyable or disagreeable b that they are not the causes of our pleasures that we have reason neither to embrace nor fear them but d that only god should be loved and feared as only he is powerful enough to punish and reward us and to make us feel pleasure and pain and finally e that only in and from god should we hope for the pleasures for which we have so strong so natural and so appropriate an inclination that our ns lead us into error e en about things that are not sensible an example taken from com rsation that we should not be concern with xternal mann rs our senses deceive us not only with regard to their objects such as light colors and the other sensible qualities they also mislead us about objects beyond their scope by preventing us from considering them carefully enough to make a wellfounded judgment this matter needs to be explained that our nses lead us into error even about things that are not sensibl the mind s attention and application to our clear and distinct ideas of objects is the most necessary thing in the world for discovering what they really are for just as the beauty of a work cannot be seen without opening the eyes and contemplating it so the mind cannot clearly see most things with their relations to one another unless it considers them attentively nowshould cause no wonder if it loses its bearings and altogether misunderstands itself what leads the soul even more into wanting a fanciful view of its sensations is that it judges them to be in objects and even to be modifications of objects and consequently that they are corporeal and can be imagined thus it judges that the nature of its sensations consists only in the motion that causes them or in some other modification of body this is different from what it pen eives which has nothing corporeal about it and cannot be represented by corporeal images this state of affairs confuses the soul and makes it believe that it does not know its own sensations as for those who do not waste their time trying to represent the soul and its modifications with corporeal images and who yet continually ask to have sensation explained to them they should know that neither the soul nor its modifications can be known through ideas taking the word idea in its true sense as i explain and specify it in the third book but only by inner sensation thus when they wish to have the soul and its sensations explained to them with ideas they want what even all men combined cannot give them since men cannot teach us by giving us ideas of things but only by making us think about those we naturally possess the second error we fall into concerning sensation is to attribute them to objects this error was explained in chapters eleven and twelve that we are mistaken in thinking tlrat eryone has the same sensations of the same objects the third error is that we judge that everyone has the same sensations of the same objects we believe for example that everyone sees the blue sky the green meadows and all visible objects in the same way we see them and so for all other sensible qualities of the other senses some people will be surprised that i cast doubt on things they thought indubitable nonetheless i can guarantee that they have never had any justification for judging these things as they have and although i cannot demonstrate mathematically that they are mistakenthe correspondence and harmony found among the facial nerves and some others answering to other nameless parts of the body is even more remarkable and what produces this great harmony is as in all the other passions that the little nerves that go to the face are still only branches of the one that descends to the lower parts of the body when one is surprised by some violent passion if one is careful to reflect upon what one feels in one s entrails and in the other parts of the body where the nerves are embedded as well as upon the accompanying changes in one s face and considers that all these different agitations of our nerves are entirely involuntary happening even despite all the resistance our will can muster against them one will have little difficulty letting oneself be convinced of the simple explanation just given of all these relations among the nerves but if one examines the reasons and purpose of all these things one will find so much order and wisdom that a little serious thought will convince even the most the search after devoted disciplies of epicurus and lucretius that there is a providence which rules the world when i see a watch i have reason to conclude that there is an intelligence because it is impossible that chance could produce and arrange all its wheels how then would it be possible for chance and the encounter of atoms to be capable of arranging in all men and in all the animals so many different forces with the precision and proportion that i have just explained and how by chance could it happen that men and animals procreate other beings that exactly resemble them thus it is simply ridiculous to think or to say with lucretius that chance formed all the parts that make up a man that eyes were not made in order to see but rather that one thinks of seeing because one has eyes and similarly with the other parts of the body lumina ne facias oculorum clara creatae

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Summary as follows:

but one such substance i think that this may profitably be done at once and in order to proceed regularly with the demonstration we must premise the true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined from this it follows that no definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined for instance the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle it does not imply any fixed number of triangles there is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it should exist this cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and definition of the thing defined or must be postulated apart from such definition it therefore follows that if a given number of individual things exist in nature there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number neither more nor less for example if twenty men exist in the universe for simplicity s sake i will suppose them existing simultaneously and to have had no predecessors and we want to account for the existence of these twenty men it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general we must also show why there are exactly twenty men neither more nor less for a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty consequently the cause for the existence of these twenty men and consequently of each of them must necessarily be sought externally to each individual hence we may lay down the absolute rule that everything which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause and as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of substance existence must necessarily be included in its definition and from its definition alone existence must be deducible but from its definition as we have shown notes ii iii we cannot infer the existence of several substancesi say first it is an association of those ideas only which involve the nature of things outside the human body not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things ideas of the modifications of the human body are strictly speaking those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies i say secondly that this association arises according to the order and association of the modifications of the human body in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas which arises from the order of the intellect whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes and which is in all men the same and hence we can further clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing which has no similarity with the first for instance from the thought of the word pomum an apple a roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question nor anything in common with it except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things that is that the man has often heard the word pomum while he was looking at the fruit similarly every man will go on from one thought to another according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body for a soldier for instance when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman and thence to the thought of war andc while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough a field andc thus every man will follow this or that train of thought according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or that mannerone sort illusive and the other sort free if our folly does not carry us so far as this we must necessarily admit that the decision of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory and is nothing more than the affirmation which an idea by virtue of being an idea necessarily involves wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity as the ideas of things actually existing therefore those who believe that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind do but dream with their eyes open the activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas the first element which constitutes the essence of the mind is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body is compounded of many other ideas whereof some are adequate and some inadequate whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind and has mind for its proximate cause through which it must be understood must necessarily follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea but in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas it is necessarily passive wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from adequate ideas and accordingly the mind is only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas